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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Subject to the timeliness of Lindstrom's Notice of Appeal, this Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03U) (Supp. 2015).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN IT
CONSIDERED LINDSTROM'S MOTION, STYLED AS A MOTION TO ALTER
JUDGMENT, TO BE SUBSTANTIVELY A MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND
NOT PROPER UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE?
Lindstrom correctly points out that Utah Courts have not explicitly stated the
applicable standard of review when reviewing a Trail Court's conclusion that a motion to
alter judgment was actually a motion for reconsideration. However, Appellee, Custom
Floor Covering, Inc., dba Carpets of America, Inc. (hereinafter "Carpets of America"),
submits that the language in B.A.M. Development, L.L. C. v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT
26, 282 P.3d 41, together with the Court's reasoning in Express Recove,y Services, Inc. v.

Richard Reuling Jr. and Margaret Reuling, 2015 UT App 299, would indicate a clearly
erroneous standard is proper.

II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN FINDING THAT NEITHER THE
NOTICE OF LIEN OR CLARIFIED NOTICE OF LIEN WERE WRONGFUL,
GIVEN THE FACTS AT THE TIME THE LIENS WERE RECORDED?
Carpets of America disputes Lindstrom's description of the Second Issue. As such,
Carpets of America has restated this issue. The Trial Court did not find that the Lien (or
Clarified Lien) met the '·plain statutory definition of a Wrongful Lien." To the contrary,
the Trial Court found that, '·pursuant to the strict language of the statute, the liens were
not wrongful ... " (R. 124.) The Trial Court did not seek to find some exception to the
1
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statutory language, rather its ruling was based upon the "strict language of the statute."
(R. 124.)

As to the standard of review, Lindstrom accurately describes the standard of
review regarding the question of whether Carpets of America's Liens were wrongful
under the Wrongful Lien Act. However, the factual findings of the Trial Court that
supported the ruling are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
In Chen v. Stewart, l 00 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004), the Court determined:
"A Trial Court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
(Citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). In order to establish that
a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, ' [a]n appe1lant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence~ the Trial Comt's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence." (quoting In re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343,
1349 (Utah 1994). /d. ,I19.
Further, Lindstrom fails to marshal evidence as to the factual findings on which
the Trial Court ultimately based its decision.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The Court's interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 59and Utah R. App. P. 4(b) will be
determinative of the first issue stated above.
The Court's interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 70 and the following statutes will be
determinative of the second issue stated above:
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102(4) (2014).
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102(11).
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102(12)(c) (2014).

2
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Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-102.
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-102(1).
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-102(2).
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-303
Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-201.
Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-202.
Utah Code Ann. § 788-5-202(7)( c).
The full text of each of the foregoing, determinative provisions, is set forth in the
Addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Carpets of America agrees ·with Lindstrom's Statement of the Case, with exception
of the following two points.
First, Lindstrom mischaracterizes the factual findings on which the Trial Court

~

based its decision. The Trial Court made four separate findings regarding the facts known
at the time the Lien and Clarified Liens were filed. Those findings include the following:
1.

The Divorce Decree was not recorded until July 11, 2011.

2.

Mr. Lindstrom was still listed as a joint owner of the house at the

time both Liens were filed.

<iii

3
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3.

There is no recorded notice that Mr. Lindstrom had been divested of

his ownership interest in the home that would have put Carpets of America on
notice.
4.

The fact that it appears from the parties' correspondence that

Lindstrom's counsel did not know about the Divorce Decree until both Liens had
been recorded. (R. 87.)
Lindstrom only references the 4 th finding in their Statement of the Case.
Second Lindstrom failed to acknowledge that she initially named Mark Hancey,
attorney for Carpets of America, as a Defendant in its Complaint (R. 1.) After motives of
bad faith and improper purpose were raised, and after a discussion with the Trial Court,
Lindstrom dismissed Mark Hancey at the November 21, 2014 hearing. (R 93, 94, 100.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the marriage of Paul and Andrea Lindstrom, Paul Lindstrom incurred a
debt with Carpets of America for the purchase of flooring materials. (R. 82, 157.)
The order was in Mr. Lindstrom's own name, not a business account. (R. 82-83.)
Whether or not the proceeds of that debt were used by Mrs. Lindstrom or for
~

household expenses have yet to be determined; as no discovery occur in this Wrongful
Lien summary proceeding.
Mr. Lindstrom and Carpets of America negotiated a refinance of this debt which

culminated in the signing of the Promissory Note dated February 12, 2011 for $14,685.13
(hereinafter "Note·'). (R. 16, 82-83.)
4
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The Note effectively delayed Carpets of America's collection of the amount owing
in exchange for collateralizing the debt. (R. 16, 82-83.)
At the time the Note was signed, Mr. Lindstrom was listed as a record title holder
to a parcel of property in Paradise Utah-Tax Id. No. 01-103-0079, LOT 2 KEN
PETERSON SUBDIVISION CONT 1.25 AC SUBJ TO UTILITY EASEMENTS AS
PER FINAL PLAT (hereinafter "Paradise Lot"). (R. 76, 80.)
Jason Ward, the President of Carpets of America, knew of this asset and relied on
it in agreeing to the terms of the Note. (R. 82-83.)
After the signing of the Note, Carpets of America instructed its legal counsel, to
prepare and record on its behalf a Notice of Lien to secure the Note against the Paradise
Lot. (R. 83.)
The Notice of Lien was recorded on February 23, 2011 (hereinafter "Lien").
Recorded as Entry No. 1039270 in Book 1659, Pg. 37. (R. 18.)
Again, at the time the Lien was filed, Paul Lindstrom was still listed as a record
title holder to the Paradise Lot. (R. 76, 80.)
On June 8, 2011, over 100 days later, Andrea Lindstrom, through counsel, sent a
letter claiming the Lien recorded against "property owned by Paul Lindstrom and Andrea
Lindstrom" was wrongful; and demanded the lien be release within 10 days. (R. 74.)
Carpets of America responded to Mrs. Lindstrom's notice the following day and
immediately recorded its Clarified Notice of Lien on June 15, 2011 as Entry 1045009 in

5
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Book 1670, Page 1012. (herein '"Clarified Lien"). The Clarified Lien specifically claimed
"'a lien as to Paul R. Lindstrom's interest only." (R. 21.)
The initial correspondence between the Parties was just the first exchanges in
VP

many written exchanges between counsel for the parties.
Continued requests by Carpets of America that the parties work together, or that
Mrs. Lindstrom provide information as to the whereabouts of Mr. Lindstrom were
ignored or rebuffed. (R. 70, 71, 82, 83, 168, 169.)
The Parties spent the next month swapping legal theories regarding the rights of a
joint tenant to encumber jointly held property. 1 (R. 56, 69, 71, 72.)
Then, on July 12, 2011 Lindstrom's shifted theories. Lindstrom's attorney
claimed to have recently learned of a Stipulated Decree of Divorce. (R. 87.)

VP

The letter included a copy of the Divorce Decree stamped by the Cache County
Recorder's Office showing it had been recorded the previous day (July 11, 2011). (R.
22.)
The signed Divorce Decree did not include a legal description, Tax ID number or
address of any real property. It simply states that, "'the parties acquired a home in
Paradise, Utah. Petitioner (Andrea Lindstrom) shall be awarded the home free and clear
of any interest to Respondent (Paul Lindstrom)." (R. 23.)

1

Including Franklin Credit Mgmt. C01p. v. Hanney, 2011 UT App 213,262 P.3d 406. A
case published during the middle of the party's exchange. Franklin confirmed the rights
of a co-tenant to encumber their undivided interest in real property.

6
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The Recorded Divorce Decree includes additional information not included or
referenced in the Divorce Decree; namely the legal description of the Paradise Lot. (R.
25.)
The disclosure of the Stipulated Decree of Divorce prompted an exchange
between counsel discussing Utah's race-notice statutes. (R. 69, 73, 85, 86.)
Carpets of America disputes any assertion that they have pressured Mrs.
ll1:.,

Lindstrom. At no time did Carpets of America threaten foreclosure of their Lien, or set
any deadlines in their requests to work with Mrs. Lindstrom and her counsel. (R. Id., 82,
83, 157, 168, 169.)
Communication went mostly dormant between the parties for nearly three years,
until a February 5, 2014 letter from the Lindstrom's attorney again stated Mrs.
Lindstrom's intent to file suit. (R. 85.)
The letter of February 5, 2014 was followed by an exchange ofletters: February
11, 2014 and February 21, 2014. (R. 69, 73.)
Again, the matter lay dormant another eight months until Mrs. Lindstrom,
through counsel, filed a Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Lien in the
First District Court of the State of Utah on November 12, 2014. That suit initially named
Carpets of America as well as its legal counsel. (R. 1.)
After a discussion with the Court regarding motives of bad faith and improper
purpose with the Trial Court, Lindstrom dismissed her claim against Carpets of
America's attorney. (R. 93, 94, 100.)
~

7
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT.
The Trial Court saw through the styling of Lindstrom's Motion- and in doing so

reclassified it as a motion to reconsider. Such motions do not toll the deadline under
Utah R. App. P. 4(b ).
This Court should find that the Trial Court was not clearly erroneous when it
reclassified Lindstrom's Motion; and should therefore dismiss Lindstrom's appeal as
untimely. Alternatively, this Court should remand to the Trial Court for additional
findings on the basis of its re-classification of the Motion with an articulation of the
standards where such a reclassification is proper.

II.

WRONGFUL LIEN.
The Court correctly acknowledged the narrow scope and limited nature of Utah's

Wrongful Lien. The Trial Court's decision was consistent with Pratt v. Pugh, 2010 UT
~

App 219, 238 P.3d I 073; that a summary proceeding brought under the Wrongful Lien
Act should not be used to determine the legal rights of the parties, nor restrict other legal
remedies. Or in other words, the Wrongful Lien Act cannot be used as an end-run around
a quiet title action.
Consistent with this approach, the Trial Court correctly concluded that the explicit
statutory language of the Wrongful Lien Act required the Court to "limit its review to
what the parties knew at the time the liens were filed" (R. 124, 188, 189.)

8
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The Trial Court made four separate factual findings. Those findings recognized
Lindstrom's failure to take any action to provide notice of her claim to the Paradise Lot.
Based on those findings, the Trial Court correctly found that Carpets of America's Lien
and Clarified Lien were authorized in writing by Mr. Lindstrom who should be treated as
an owner of the Paradise Lot at the time the Liens were recorded. 2
The Trial Court would not let subsequent notice of a Divorce Decree undo the
bona fide agreement negotiated by Carpets of America.
The Trial Court's approach is the only way to read the Wrongful Lien Act in
harmony with Utah's Race-Notice Statutes. 3 Utah's Race-Notice Statutes declare
unrecorded interests in property void as to prior recorded interests held by bona fide
purchasers. Utah's Race-Notice Statutes are designed "to foster the alienability of real
property, and to provide for predictability and integrity in real estate transactions.''

F.D.I. C v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, iJ23, 267 P.3d 949.
The Trial Court's decision is also consistent with the policy differences between
consensual liens and judgement liens. While Lindstrom asks the Court to rely upon a
reference to bare legal title as found in Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107 (Utah 1983), that
approach is misguided. Bare legal title is relevant when evaluating the rights of a
judgment creditor--not a consensual lien holder. The Trial Court's decision evidences a

2

Based upon the information at the Cache County Recorder's office, Lindstrom's failure
to take any actions to give notice of her claim to the property, and fact that Carpets of
America had no knowledge of the Divorce Decree.
3
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 & I 03.
9
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~

correct understanding that Carpets of America's Lien is not a judgement lien, but is a
consensual lien. And while consensual liens are protected under Utah's Race-Notice
Statutes, judgment liens are not.
Lindstrom's proposal to treat consensual liens like judgement liens would nullify
the protections of the Race-Notice Statute; it would place in jeopardy every transaction
involving an interest in real property to a later discovery of a previously unrecorded
transfer involving that same property.
For this reason, the Trial Court correctly evaluated the facts at the time Carpets of
America's Lien and Clarified Lien were filed, which facts demonstrate that Mr.
Lindstrom was identified as the owner of the property in the County records.
The Trial Court also correctly provided a roadmap for the parties to adjudicate
~

their final property rights under Utah's Race-Notice statute through a quiet title action.
This action has commenced, and is the proper venue for the parties to resolve their
respective interest in the property.

ARGUMENT

i.j;

I.
LINDSTROM'S MOTION, STYLED AS A MOTION TO ALTER
JUDGMENT, WAS SUBSTANTIVELY A MOTION TO RECONSIDER.
A.

Standard of Review.

B.A.M Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT 26, if 14, 282 P.3d 41
states that "unconvincing and repetitive" arguments are insufficient grounds for
reclassifying a Rule 59 motion as procedurally improper. However, the B.A.M. Court
then went on to hold that: "Rule 4(b) is triggered by the filing of a motion that is properly

10
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styled as one of the motions enumerated in the rule and that plausibly requests the
relevant relief." (Emphasis added). Id. ,113.
In the later ruling of Express Recovery Sen,fces Inc. v. Richard Reuling Jr. and
Margaret Reuling, 2015 UT App 299, this Court noted that evidence suggesting that a

motion styled as a Rule 59 motion filed in "bad faith or with knowledge that the Trial
Court would recast it as a motion to reconsider" could result in the motion being
reclassified as a motion to reconsider. Id. if24.
Factors such as "'plausibly", ··bad faith'' and "'knowledge" require factual
conclusions--conclusions which should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

B.

Trial Court's findings.

The Trial Court found:
~

•'Additionally, the Court considers the Motion to Alter Judgment a motion to
reconsider. Even though counsel has styled it as a Motion to Alter Judgment, the
same arguments are being presented to the Court and counsel is asking the Court
to reconsider the same arguments presented at the November 21, 2014 hearing.
The Court considers this to be a motion to reconsider and not proper under the
Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 189.)
The Trial Court is in the best position to evaluate the tenor of the motion and
should be afforded the discretion in making a determination to reclassify it as a motion to
reconsider.
Lindstrom has failed to marshal any evidence as to these findings.
To the extent that the findings of the Trial Court are insufficient, this Court should
determine if the Trial Court abused its discretion; the matter should be remanded to the
~
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Trial Court for additional findings, together with further direction from this Court to
.rJ

guide the Trial.
Given that the motion to reconsider would not toll the timeliness of filing the
appeal under Rule 4(b), a resolution of this question is necessary to establish jurisdiction
of this Court.

II.
CARPETS OF AMERICA'S LIEN AND CLARIFIED LIEN WERE NOT
WRONGFUL LIENS.
A.

The Trial Court correctly recognized the narrow scope of relief under
Utah's Wrongful Lien Act.

This Court previously articulated the limited scope of a wrongful lien petition in

Pratt v. Pugh, 2010 UT App 219, 238 P.3d 1073. In Pratt the plaintiff brought an action
seeking to declare certain Trust Deeds wrongful. While the plaintiff prevailed at the
hearing, on appeal this Court overturned the trial court's decision.
In its ruling the Pratt Court explained; "[t]he summary proceeding contemplated
by [the wrongful lien statute] is limited in a number of respects. For example, the
summary proceeding is only to determine whether or not a document is a wrongful lien."
... The court shall not determine any other property or legal rights of the parties nor
restrict other legal remedies of any party." (Internal citations omitted.) Id. ,I9.
The Pratt Court was unwilling to convert a secured loan into an unsecured loan
within wrongful lien proceeding. Nor was Pratt prepared to allow a summary hearing
under a wrongful lien petition to have the defacto consequence of ruling on the efficacy
of the underlying Note.
12
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This limited approach was confinned in Todd Hollow Apartments at Deer
Mountain, LP v. Homes at Deer Mountain Homeowners Association, Inc., 357 P.3d 580

(Utah App. 2015). Therein, this Court held "[t]he Wrongful Lien Act provides in
relevant part that" [a] summary proceeding under this section is only to detennine
whether or not a document is a wrongful lien" and II shall not detennine any other
11

property or legal rights of the parties. (Internal citations omitted.) Id. if28.
Lindstrom's Appeal asks this Court to do the very thing this Court has already
disavowed-namely, converting Carpets of America's secured loan into an unsecured
loan.
The Trial Court properly acknowledged that the underling claims of Lindstrom
and Carpets of America cannot be resolved via a summary proceeding. (R. 123-125.)
As such, the Trial Court correctly directed the Parties to seek a resolution of their
dispute via a separate quiet title action. (R. 125.)
That separate quite title proceeding has commenced and is currently before the
First District Court, Case Number 150100495. Therein, the District Court will detennine
the relative rights of the parties under Utah's Race-Notice Statutes and other relevant
statutes and case law. That approach is consistent with the direction in Pratt and Todd
Hollow Apartments.

13
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~

III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CORRECTLY ANALYZED THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING AT THE TIME THE NOTICE OF
LIEN AND CLARIFIED NOTICE OF LIEN WERE RECORDED.
A.

The facts and circumstance at the time the Lien and Clarified Lien
were recorded.

Utah Code Ann. §38-9-102(4) directs courts to only look at the facts and
circumstances existing at ''the time it was recorded."
The Trial Court recognized this limited scope when it held, "it must limit its
review to what the parties knew at the time the Liens were filed." (R. 124.)
The Trial Court made the following factual findings:
1.

The Divorce Decree was not recorded until July 11, 2011.

2.

Mr. Lindstrom was still listed as a joint owner of the house at the time both

liens were filed.
3.

There was no recorded notice that Mr. Lindstrom had been divested of his

ownership interest in the home that would have put Carpets of America on notice.
4.

In Fact, it appears from the parties' correspondence that Carpets of America

did not know about the Divorce Decree until both liens were filed. (R. 124.)
Because Lindstrom failed to marshal evidence against these factual findings, this
Court should accept such factual findings as true when analyzing Carpets of America's
Liens.

14
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B.

Trial Court's findings correctly employ requirements of the Wrongful
Lien Act.

Based on the four factual findings, the Trial Court concluded that Mr. Lindstrom
was to be considered a joint owner of the Paradise Lot- based upon the facts at the time
of recording. (R. 124.) As such, the Trial Court concluded that Carpets of America's
Liens were authorized pursuant to a document signed by an owner of the real property.
See Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102(12)(c) (2014). (R. 124.)
The Trial Courf s approach in looking at the facts at the time of recording is
consistent with Pratt v. Pugh, 2010 UT App 219, ,Il 0, 238 P.3d 1073, wherein this Court
explained:
"This section is explicit that the wrongfulness of a lien must be determined as of
·the time it is recorded or filed,' ... Indeed, we have held that this section requires
a court to evaluate the validity of a lien ·based on the facts known at the time it
was recorded, not at a later point in time after evaluating the merits." (Quoting
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, ,I 50, 166 P.3d 639.)
Lindstrom proposes that the facts known at the time the lien was recorded are
irrelevant. This contention is contrary to the explicit language of the statute and case law.
C.
The Trial Court's decision correctly acknowledges that knowledge is
an essential element in the first question of whether or not a lien was
wrongful.
The fact that knowledge plays a role in the damage provisions does not negate the
role knowledge also plays in the initial question of wrongfulness.

ijy
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The facts of this case deal with the recording priority of two documents conveying
title. 4 This dispute triggers Utah's Race-Notice provisions. Because knowledge is an
essential element under the Race-Notice provisions, Carpets of America~s knowledge at
the time of recording is an essential element in detennining the validity of Carpets of
America's lien. For this reason, the Trial Court rightfully addressed the issue of
knowledge.
D.
The Trial Court's decision correctly acknowledged that subsequent
knowledge of the Divorce Decree cannot undo bona-fide purchaser status.
Lindstrom contends that once she provided notice of the Divorce Decree, nearly 5
months after the recording of the Lien (and 18 months after the Divorce Decree was
signed), such notice should retroactively make Carpets of America's Liens wrongful.
This approach was rejected by Pratt, which held that such ··analysis employs the very
retrospective evaluation of the trust deeds prohibited by controlling law. As noted above,
the wrongfulness of a lien must be detennined as of the time it is recorded or filed."
(Internal citations omitted.) Id. if 13.
Knowledge at the time of recording is also key because subsequent knowledge
cannot retroactively nullify an interest that initially would have priority under Utah's
Race-Notice statutory framework.

4

Assuming the Divorce Decree acts as a conveyance under Utah R. Civ. P. 70. The
Divorce Decree does not identify the legal description, address or tax identification
number of real property. Moreover, the Divorce Decree uses future tense language such
as "shall be awarded" rather than '~is hereby awarded." In short, the Decree does not
include language sufficient to create a conveyance of the lot without the need of a
separate deed as described called for in Rule 70.
16
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH'S
RACE-NOTICE STATUTES.

~

Limiting a review to facts known at the time of recording is the only way for the
Wrongful Lien Act to be read in harmony with Utah's Race-Notice Statues. Otherwise,
the Wrongful Lien Act would eviscerate the protections of Utah's Race-Notice Statutes.
A.
Utah's land recording system is the tool designed to give confidence
and value to real estate values and transactions.
As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, in F.D.l C v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416,
if23, 267 P.3d 949 "'the recording statute [Race-Notice Statute] is intended to ... foster
alienability of real property, and to provide for predictability and integrity in real estate
transactions." (Citing Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, ,r 18, 994 P.2d
201.)
Lindstrom could have and should have availed herself of the protections afforded
by the Race-Notice statutes by recording some document declaring her interest in her
husband's portion of the Paradise Lot. She did not. As such, Carpets of America is

~

justified in relying on the County Recorder's Office records in negotiating the terms of
the Note and recording the resulting Clarified Lien.

ii
Make no mistake, Lindstrom's approach would gut Utah's Race-Notice Statutes and the public policies those statutes are designed to protect. Lindstrom seeks an order
from this Court declaring that a prior unrecorded transfer would convert a bona fide
purchaser into a Wrongful Lien Holder. Under Lindstrom's approach, every recorded
transfer would be vulnerable to an unrecorded prior transfer.
17
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B.

Utah's Race-Notice Statutes.

Utah's Legislature has provided Utah's Race-Notice Statutes, as found in Utah
Code Ann. §57-3-102 & 103.
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102 provides that documents recorded according to this
section ··shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart
notice to all persons of their contents."
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103, titled Effect of Failure to Record, provides:
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(I) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
Simply put, Carpets of America recorded first and without notice of the Divorce
Decree. As such, Lindstrom's claim is void as to Carpets of America's Lien.

C.

Utah's Race-Notice Statutes apply to conveyances of security interests.

Carpets of America is a purchaser entitled to protections under Utah Code Ann.
57-3-102 & 103.
Carpets of America's protection as a purchaser of a security interest is explicitly
set forth by statute. Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102(1) refers to financing statements and
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102(2) states: "If a recorded document was given as security ... " 5

5

See also Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-303.

18
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Eighty-five years of precedent confirms that consensual lien holders are entitled to
such protection.
In 1931 the Supreme Court of Utah acknowledged such in Crompton v. Jenson, I
P.2d 242 (Utah 1931 ). Crompton dealt with two competing security interests. The Court
applied the principles of the Race-Notice statute to determine which party was entitled to
priority. In that case, one mortgage was signed and delivered on May 3, 1904. That
mortgage, even though it was entitled to be recorded, was not. Over ten years later
another mortgage was signed and promptly recorded. McKinney was the holder of the
later signed but first recorded mortgage. On these facts the Crompton Court reasoned,
'"There is, however, nothing in the record before us which shows that Mr. McKinney, the
then owner and holder of plaintiffs mortgage, had either actual or constructive notice [of
the earlier mortgage] ... Under the rule of law announced in the case of Boucojski v.

Jacobsen, [104 P. 117, 122 (Utah 1909)] ... the rights of the holder of the plaintiffs
mortgage remain intact so long as such holder is without actual or constructive notice for
the full period of the statute of limitations, that the property was subject to another
mortgage." Id. at 246.
Fast forward nearly 40 years to 1970 and the Utah Supreme Court of Kemp v.

Zions First Nation Bank, 470 P.2d 390 (Utah 1970). Therein, the Court ruled on the
priority of two competing security interest. We need look no further than the opening
paragraphs of the decision which states:
"This is a suit in equity over which takes precedence: a prior in time, but
later recorded, purchase money mortgage, asserted by the plaintiffs Kemp, or a
19
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~

later in time, but prior recorded trust deed (mortgage) asserted by the defendant
Zions First National Bank. The trial was to the court with a jury. The pivotal issue
as it is presented by the parties in this appeal centers upon the jury's answers to
two questions as to whether the defendant Bank had notice that the plaintiffs
Kemp had an interest in the property when the Bank advanced money thereon and
took its Mortgage:
1.
Do you find that Zions First National Bank actually had notice?
Answer: No.
2.
Do you find that the Bank*** should have been aware of such an
unpaid balance?
Answer: Yes.
On the bases of those answers, and his own analysis of the evidence and the
law, the trial judge ruled that the defendant Bank's prior recorded trust deed
(mortgage) took precedence.'' Id. at 391.
The Kemp Court concluded: ··Upon the basis of our discussion herein we can see
no persuasive reason to disagree with the view taken by the trail court that the priorrecorded mortgage of the defendant Zion's First National Bank should take precedence
over the plaintiffs' later-recorded mortgage." Id. at 393.
D.

No constructive notice.

The Trial Courts four factual findings (Supra 13-14.) confirm Carpets of America
had no actual or constructive notice of the Divorce Decree.
E.
Trial Court's reliance on facts known at recording to determine that
Mr. Lindstrom as an "owner" is the only way to harmonize Wrongful Lien
Statutes with Race-Notice Statutes.
The Trial Court's decision is consistent with finding that Mr. Lindstrom was an
owner of the Paradise Lot at the time the Promissory Note was signed and at the time
both Liens were recorded. Utah Code Ann. 38-9-102( 12)( c) provides that "there is no
wrongful lien if the lien was signed or authorized pursuant to a document signed by an
owner of the real property." Based upon the four factual findings, the Trial Court
20
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concluded Mr. Lindstrom qualified as an owner as defined by Utah Code Ann. 38-9102(11).
The Trial Court's approach is the only way to interpret the Wrongful Lien Statutes
in harmony with Utah's Race-Notice Statutes, otherwise any subsequent purchaser would
be subject to the Wrongful Lien Act.
V.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSENSUAL LIENS AND JUDGMENT
LIENS.
A.

Distinguishing Judgment Liens versus Consensual Liens.

Lindstrom focuses on the phrase bare legal title found in Lund v. Donihue, 674
P.2d 107 (Utah 1983). That case adjudicates the right of a judgment lien against an
unrecorded divorce decree. Lindstrom then transposes that analysis upon Carpets of
America's consensual lien. This approach ignores the legal differences between judgment
liens and consensual liens in Utah.
B.

Rights of Judgment Liens.

Judgment liens gain their statutory rights under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-201 &
►

202. Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-202(7)(c) provides:
"The real property subject to the [judgment] lien includes all real property of the
judgment debtor: ... owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the
time the judgment is effective."
When evaluating the rights of a judgment lien, the court must determine the
equitable title rights of the "judgment debtor." See Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802
(Utah App. 1987).

This approach is not applicable in consensual transfer.
21
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ii

In Kartchner v. State Tax Commission, 294 P.2d 790, 791 (Utah 1956), the Court
stated that a "judgment lien [is] subordinate and inferior to a deed which predate[s] it,
whether recorded after such judgment or whether not recorded at all." 6

Again, these

statutory requirements do not apply to consensual liens.

C.

Rights of Consensual Liens.

Statutory framework prescribing the rights of competing priorities of certain
consensual liens is spelled out in Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103. That Statute provides that
"'each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent
purchaser of the same real property." The phrase "subsequent purchaser" implies the
existence of a '"prior purchaser".
Utah Code Annotated §57-3-103 directs courts on how to weigh the priority of
these two purchasers. In such a context the term "bare legal title~' is not relevant. 7
Certainly one who conveyed property to a "Prior Purchaser" via a warranty deed not even
retain bare legal tile-as title was conveyed vie said warranty deed to the prior
purchaser. 8 Nonetheless, should the prior purchaser fail to record their warranty deed,

01
6

See also: Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983); Johnson v. Casper, 75 Idaho
256,270 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1954); Teed v. Rico Realty, 134 Ariz. 258,655 P.2d 798
(1982); Wilson v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 280 OR. 45,569 P.2d 609,611 (1977).
7
The Trial Court cited Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107 (Utah 1983) in its Memorandum
Decision in the section outlining Lindstrom's contentions. (R. 124.) The Court did not go
on to rule on the applicability of Lund. To avoid any confusion, Appellee submits Lund is
not applicable to consensual liens--and this Court should so declare.
8
Lindstrom has not contended the Divorce Decree creates any greater rights to the
property than a warranty deed would convey.
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their interest in the property is subject to the claims of a subsequent purchaser who
~

records first.
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-303 further articulates how Utah's statutory framework
distinguishes between Judgment liens and consensual liens. That Section provides:
An instrument is issued or transferred for value if:
(a) the instrument is issued or transferred for a promise of performance, to
the extent the promise has been performed;
(b) the transferee acquires a security interest or other lien in the instrument
other than a lien obtained by judicial proceeding:
(c) the instrument is issued or_transferred as payment of, or as security for,
an antecedent claim against any person, whether or not the claim is due;
(d) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for a negotiable
instrument; or
(e) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for the incurring of
an irrevocable obligation to a third party by the person taking the
instrument. (Emphasis Added)
Utah case law further illuminates the rights of consensual lien holders. In Ault v.

Holden, 2002 UT 33, ,I3 l, 44 P.3d 781, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "In Utah,
between two purchasers of real property, the first to validly record a conveyance and take
the property without notice of a prior interest in the property takes the property over a
purchaser who subsequently records a deed." (Internal citations omitted.) This approach
is consistent with the finding in Boswell v. Jasperson, 266 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1319 (D.
Utah 2003), which provided that "in a race-notice jurisdiction such as Utah, a bona fide
purchaser who perfects his interest takes free of any prior unrecorded interest in the real
property." (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 1319.

~
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This Court confirmed the applicability of Utah's Recording Act/Race-Notice
~

Statutes with security interests in F.D.I. C. v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, ,I25, 267 P.3d
949, stating:
''While the after-acquired title statute operates to convey title, the validity of
competing interests in real property is generally governed by Utah's recording
statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102( I) (providing that documents 'from the
time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons
of their contents'); id. § 57-3-103 (providing that an unrecorded document is void
against a subsequent purchaser who 'purchased the property in good faith and for
a valuable consideration,' and whose •document is first duly recorded'). Pursuant
to Utah's race-notice recording scheme, 'between two purchasers of real property,
the first to validly record a conveyance and take the property without notice of a
prior interest in the property takes the property over a purchaser who subsequently
records a deed." (Internal citations omitted.)

D.

Policy reasons for distinguishing Judgment and Consensual Liens.

In F.D.l C. the Court set forth the policy reasons for the Race Notice Statutes. It stated:
"The recording statute is 'intended to impede fraud, to foster the alienability of
real property, and to provide for predictability and integrity in real estate
transactions." (Internal Citations Omitted.) Id. ,I23.
This policy reason further explains the reason Utah treats judgment lien rights and
consensual lien rights differently. Judgment lien rights do not focus on the alienability of
real property or the predictability and integrity of real estate transactions. Rather,
judgment liens deal with efforts to satisfy judgments, requiring through the seizure and
sale of a debtor's property interests.
The policy reasons for treating judgment liens different from consensual liens was
again spelled out by Utah's Supreme Court in Garland v. Fleishman, 831 P.2d 107 (Utah
1992). In Garland a Judgment lien holder sought the rights of a consensual lien holder.
24
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The Court said no. In so finding, Utah's Supreme Court analyzed the two competing
interests of a judgment creditor and a fee title holder. Therein the Court held:
"Fleischmann [the judgment lien holder] points out that when she docketed her
judgment in Garfield County in 1985, as well as when the sheriff's sale was held
and when the sheriffs deed was issued to and recorded by her, the land records in
Garfield County showed that lot 128 was owned by Rimaras. Nothing appeared of
record that the Garlands had any legal interest in the lot. She relies on Utah Code
Ann. § 57-3-3 9, which provides that any document purporting to give an interest in
real property is void against any subsequent purchaser if the purchaser bought in
good faith for a valuable consideration. and the subsequent purchaser's document
is first duly recorded. This contention is unavailing because a judgment creditor
such as Fleischmann is not a bona fide purchaser." (Emphasis added). Id. at 112.
Carpets of America is not a judgment creditor, but rather a holder of a consensual
lien purchased as part of an exchange that delayed collection of a debt, and is therefore
entitled to the protections afforded to bona-fide purchasers-not judgment lien holders.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CORRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT EQUITY FAVORS RECORDED CONSENSUAL LIENS OVER
UNRECORDED DIVORCE DECREES.
Carpets of America negotiated in good faith with Mr. Lindstrom and exchanged
good and valuable consideration in the execution of the Note. As such, Carpets of
America is a bona fide purchaser of its consensual lien. Equities thus side with Carpets of
America, not Lindstrom.
Lindstrom had ample opportunity to record a !is pendens at the initiation of the
divorce proceedings, or record the Divorce Decree itself once entered so that the public

9

Currently Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103 (1998).
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would be on notice of her claim - she did not. Carpets of America should not bear the
consequences of Lindstrom's inaction.
Lindstrom's proposal to treat consensual liens like judgment liens nullifies Utah's
Raced-Notice Statutes and the public policy consideration of said statutes.
This is why the Trial Court followed the instructions outlined in Pratt, specifically
that "the wrongfulness of a lien must be determined as of the time it is recorded ... " Pratt
v. Pugh, 2010 UT App 219, ifl3, 238 P.3d 1073.

This is why the Trial Court held "it must limit its review to what the parties knew
at time the Liens were filed." (R. 124.)
This is why the Trial Court made those four factual findings regarding notice.

If the Court finds that Carpets of America cannot rely on the records of the Cache
County Recorder's office, then no prospective purchaser may rely on records of the
County Recorder.
As such, the Trial Court's decision should be Affirmed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm that the Trial Court was not clearly erroneous in its
determination to characterize Lindstrom's Rule 59 Motion to Alter Judgment as a Motion
to Reconsider. As such, Lindstrom did not timely file the Notice of Appeal. Alternatively,
this Court could remand the matter to the Trial Court for additional findings as to why it
characterized the motion; with guidelines pertaining to such a characterization.
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In the event that the Court chooses to rule on the underlying merits, this Court
should find that the Trial Court did not error in finding that neither of Carpets of
America's Liens were wrongful. This Court may further find that the Liens were not
wrongful, as they were authorized by Mr. Lindstrom in the signing of the Promissory
Note. And that Mr. Lindstrom should be treated as an owner of the Paradise Lot at the
time the Liens were recorded based on the factual findings of the Trial Court. As such,
Carpets of America is entitled to the protections of Utah's Race-Notice Statutes, Utah
Code Ann.§ 57-3-102 & 103.
The Court should award Carpets of America the costs associated with this appeal.
I~
DATED this
day of March, 2016.

_!f_

)

5
s
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 787-1444
Attorney for Appellee

, Suite 110
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ADDENDUM
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Determinative Provisions
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in
a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)( 1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
motion:
(b)(l)(A) A motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b )( 1)(B) A motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1 )(C) A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(b )( 1)(D) A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(b )( 1)(E) A motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

(;

(b )(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to
appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b ), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of
appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
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( d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal is docketed in the court in which it was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Motion for extension of time.
( e)( 1) The trial court, upon a showing of good cause, may extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal upon motion filed before the expiration of the time prescribed by
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. Responses to such motions for an extension of time
are disfavored and the court may rule at any time after the filing of the motion. No
extension shall exceed 30 days beyond the prescribed time or 14 days beyond the date of
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
( e)(2) The trial court, upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. The court may
rule at any time after the filing of the motion. That a movant did not file a notice of
appeal to which paragraph (c) would apply is not relevant to the determination of good
cause or excusable neglect. No extension shall exceed 30 days beyond the prescribed
time or 14 days beyond the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.

(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate
the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement
shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the
defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The
prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to file a written response. If the
prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may
present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has demonstrated that the defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, it shall
enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order.
(g) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in civil cases.
(g)( 1) The trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal if the
trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(g)(l )(A) The party seeking to appeal lacked actual notice of the entry of judgment at a
time that would have allowed the party to file a timely motion under paragraph (e) of this
rule;
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(g)(l )(B) The party seeking to appeal exercised reasonable diligence in monitoring the
proceedings; and
(g)(l)(C) The party, if any, responsible for serving the judgment under Rule 58A(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure did not promptly serve a copy of the signed judgment
on the party seeking to appeal.
(g)(2) A party seeking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the trial court
within one year from the entry of judgment. The party shall comply with Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall serve each of the parties in accordance with Rule
5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(g)(3) If the trial court enters an order reinstating the time for filing a direct appeal, a
notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of the order.
Advisory Committee Note
Paragraph (f) was adopted to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning
v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(l) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
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(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 14 days after
the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(l ), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion
for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The
opposing party has 14 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits.
The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be
extended for an additional period not exceeding 21 days either by the court for good
cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply
affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 14 days after entry of judgment the court of its
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment
shall be served not later than 14 days after entry of the judgment.
~

Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other
documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the
time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party
by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as if
done by the party. On application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of
the court, the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property
of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court may also in
proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal property is within the state,
the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the
title of any party and vesting it in others and such judgment has the effect of a
conveyance executed in due form of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery
of possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or
assistance upon application to the clerk
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Wrongful Lien Act
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-102 (2014).
Definitions.
As used in this chapter:

(1) "Affected person" means:
(a) a person who is a record interest holder of the real property that is the subject of
a recorded nonconsensual common law document; or
(b) the person against whom a recorded non consensual common law document
purports to reflect or establish a claim or obligation.
(2) "Document sponsor" means a person who, personally or through a designee, signs or
submits for recording a document that is, or is alleged to be, a nonconsensual
common law document.
(3) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee,
or beneficial owner.
(4) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a
lien, or notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(5) "Nonconsensual common law document" means a document that is submitted to a
county recorder's office for recording against public official property that:
(a) purports to create a lien or encumbrance on or a notice of interest in the real
property;
(b) at the time the document is recorded, is not:
(i) expressly authorized by this chapter or a state or federal statute;
(ii) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction; or
(iii) signed by or expressly authorized by a document signed by the owner of
the real property; and

0@
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(c) is submitted in relation to the public official's status or capacity as a public
official.
(6) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in real property.
(7) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, town, school district, special
improvement or taxing district, local district, special service district, or other
governmental subdivision or public corporation.

Gv

(8) "Public official" means:
(a) a current or former:
(i) member of the Legislature;
(ii) member of Congress;
(iii) judge;
(iv) member of law enforcement;
(v) corrections officer;
(vi) active member of the Utah State Bar; or
(vii) member of the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(b) an individual currently or previously appointed or elected to an elected position

m:
(i) the executive branch of state or federal government; or
(ii) a political subdivision;
(c) an individual currently or previously appointed to or employed in a position in a
political subdivision, or state or federal government that:
(i) is a policymaking position; or
(ii) involves:
(A) purchasing or contracting decisions;
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(B) drafting legislation or making rules;
(C) determining rates or fees; or
(D) making adjudicative decisions; or
(d) an immediate family member of a person described in
Subsections .(fil.(fil through.(£}.
(9) "Public official property" means real property that has at least one record interest
holder who is a public official.
(10) (a) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in real property, including an owner, titleholder,
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that
real property appears in the county recorder's records for the county in which
the property is located.
(b) "Record interest holder" includes any granter in the chain of the title in real
property.

( 11) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which
the property is located.
(12) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real
property.
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Race-Notice Statutes
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-102. (2000)
Record imparts notice -- Change in interest rate -- Validity of document -- Notice of
unnamed interests -- Conveyance by grantee.
( 1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with
Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location
complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with
Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording
with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided
under Subsection il}.
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties to
the document and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries
or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any
interest of the granter or of the interest of any other person not named in the
document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and
clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in
any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of
the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property
subject to the interest.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103 (1998).
Effect of failure to record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent
purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
( 1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable
consideration; and
~

(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

Uniform Commercial Code - Negotiable Instruments
Enforcement of Instruments
Utah Code Ann.§ 70A-3-303 (1993)
Value and consideration.
(1) An instrument is issued or transferred for value if:

(a) the instrument is issued or transferred for a promise of performance, to the extent
the promise has been performed;
(b) the transferee acquires a security interest or other lien in the instrument other
than a lien obtained by judicial proceeding;
(c) the instrument is issued or transferred as payment of, or as security for, an
antecedent claim against any person, whether or not the claim is due;
(d) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for a negotiable instrument;
or
(e) the instrument is issued or transferred in exchange for the incurring of an
irrevocable obligation to a third party by the person taking the instrument.
(2) "Consideration" means any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. The
drawer or maker of an instrument has a defense if the instrument is issued without
consideration. If an instrument is issued for a promise of performance, the issuer has
a defense to the extent performance of the promise is due and the promise has not

~
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been performed. If an instrument is issued for value as stated in Subsection ill, the
instrument is also issued for consideration.

Judgments
Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-201 (2014).
Definitions -- Judgment recorded in Registry of Judgments.
(1) For purposes of this part, "Registry of Judgments" means the index where a
judgment is filed and searchable by the name of the judgment debtor through
electronic means or by tangible document.
(2) On or after July 1, 1997, a judgment entered in a district court does not create a lien
upon or affect the title to real property unless the judgment is filed in the Registry of
Judgments of the office of the clerk of the district court of the county in which the
property is located.
(3) (a) On or after July 1, 2002, except as provided in Subsection Ll.l{hl, a judgment
entered in a district court does not create a lien upon or affect the title to real
property unless the judgment or an abstract of judgment is recorded in the office
of the county recorder in which the real property of the judgment debtor is
located.
(b) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection Ll}W.
(4) In addition to the requirements of Subsections ill and Ll}W, any judgment that is
filed in the Registry of Judgments on or after September 1, 1998, or any judgment or
abstract of judgment that is recorded in the office of a county recorder after July 1,
2002, shall include:
(a) the information identifying the judgment debtor as required under
Subsection ill.{hl on the judgment or abstract of judgment; or
(b) a copy of the separate information statement of the judgment creditor that
contains:
(i) the correct name and last-known address of each judgment debtor and the
address at which each judgment debtor received service of process;
(ii) the name and address of the judgment creditor;
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(iii) the amount of the judgment as filed in the Registry of Judgments;
(iv) if known, the judgment debtor's Social Security number, date of birth, and
driver's license number if a natural person; and
(v) whether or not a stay of enforcement has been ordered by the court and the
date the stay expires.
(5) For the information required in Subsection ill, the judgment creditor shall:
(a) provide the information on the separate information statement if known or
available to the judgment creditor from its records, its attorney's records, or the
court records in the action in which the judgment was entered; or
(b) state on the separate information statement that the information is unknown or
unavailable.

viP

(6) (a) Any judgment that requires payment of money and is entered in a district court
on or after September 1, 1998, or any judgment or abstract of judgment recorded
in the office of a county recorder after July 1, 2002, that does not include the
debtor identifying information as required in Subsection ill is not a lien until a
separate information statement of the judgment creditor is recorded in the office
of a county recorder in compliance with Subsections ill and ill(b) The separate information statement of the judgment creditor referred to in
Subsection ®.{ru shall include:
(i) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee;
(ii) the date on which the judgment was recorded in the office of the county
recorder as described in Subsection ill; and
(iii) the county recorder's entry number and book and page of the recorded
judgment.
(7) A judgment that requires payment of money recorded on or after September 1, 1998,
but prior to July 1, 2002, has as its priority the date of entry, except as to parties with
actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment.
(8) A judgment or notice of judgment wrongfully filed against real property is subject
to Title 38, Chapter 9, Wrongful Lien Act.
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(9) (a) To release, assign, renew, or extend a lien created by a judgment recorded in the
office of a county recorder, a person shall, in the office of the county recorder of
each county in which an instrument creating the lien is recorded, record a
document releasing, assigning, renewing, or extending the lien.
(b) The document described in Subsection 12.li.ru shall include:
(i) the date of the release, assignment, renewal, or extension;
(ii) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee; and
(iii) for the county in which the document is recorded in accordance with
Subsection .(2}(ru:
(A) the date on which the instrument creating the lien was recorded in that
county's office of the county recorder; and
(B) in accordance with Section 57-3-106, that county recorder's entry
number and book and page of the recorded instrument creating the
judgment lien.

Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-202 (2014).
Duration of judgment -- Judgment as a lien upon real property -- Abstract of
judgment -- Small claims judgment not a lien -- Appeal of judgment -- Child
support orders.
( 1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court unless
previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance
with law.
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections ill and ill, the entry of
judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the judgment
debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the
judgment, located in the county in which the judgment is entered.
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be
filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment
entered in that court.
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(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims
division of any court may not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to
the civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection .Q}.
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit with the court where the notice of
appeal is filed of cash or other security in a form and amount considered
sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the
judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or
costs, including attorney fees and costs on appeal, the lien created by the
judgment shall be terminated as provided in Subsection~(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection G)_{fil, the court
shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and granting the
judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the
original judgment.
(6) (a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support may be
enforced:
(i) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; or
~

(ii) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a
tribunal.
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order.
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration.
(7) (a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the
state becomes a lien upon real property if:
(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78B-5201 (4 )(b) is recorded in the office of the county recorder; or
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information
statement of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78B-5201 (5) is recorded in the office of the county recorder.
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice
court.
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(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the judgment
debtor:

~

(i) in the county in which the recording under Subsection {7){a)(i) or {ill occurs;
and

(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the
judgment is effective.
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection fll(fil.
(8) (a) A judgment referred to in Subsection ill shall be entered under the name of the
judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county recorder as
required in Section I 7-21-6.
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the
appropriate tract index in the office of the county recorder.
(9) (a) To release, assign, renew, or extend a lien created by a judgment recorded in the
office of a county recorder, a person shall, in the office of the county recorder of
each county in which an instrument creating the lien is recorded, record a
document releasing, assigning, renewing, or extending the lien.
(b) The document described in Subsection f2l(ru shall include:
(i) the date of the release, assignment, renewal, or extension;
(ii) the name of any judgment creditor, debtor, assignor, or assignee; and
(iii) for the county in which the document is recorded in accordance with
Subsection .(2.l(ru:
(A) the date on which the instrument creating the lien was recorded in that
county's office of the county recorder; and
(B) in accordance with Section 57-3-106, that county recorder's entry
number and book and page of the recorded instrument creating the
judgment lien.
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$14,685.13

DATE: February./-~ 2011

NOTE HOLDER: Custom Floor Coverings, Inc. DBA Carpets of America

BORROWER: Paul Lindstrom

For good and ,·illble consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the Borrower, Borrower promises to pa.y U.S.
$14,6$5.13 (this amount is called "Principal.,), plus interest as set forth herein, to the order of the Note Holder. Borrower will
make all payments under lbis "'Note" in tl1e fonn of cash, check or money order.
Borrower understands that the Note Holder may transfer this Note. 111c Note Holder or anyone who takes this Note by transfer
and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is calJed the ''Note Holder''.
Interest shall accrue at ten-percent ( 10%) from the date of the Note until paid in full.
Payment. Payment wi11 be made ns follows: $100 per month due on or before t11c 111 of each month beginning Marcb 1,201 J.
ff the payment day falls on a holiday or weekend, then the payment will be due tbe nex1: business day,
NotwiUlStanding, on or before March l, 2012, Borrower will repay the remaining balance of all outstanding Principal, plus all
accrued unpaid Interest, :md other costs n.nd fees associated with this lonn. Unless otherwise agreed or required by applicttble
law. payments will be applied first to any unpaid collection costs and late fee charges, and then to any unpaid interest and any
remaining amount to PrincipaJ.
AppJicntion of Payments. Any ancl all payments by any Borrower under this Promissmy Note shall be applied as foJJows: 1)
Payment ofnll reasonable costs 1111d collections including reasonable attorney's fees; 2) Payment of loan fees; 3) Payment of any
late charges; 4) Payment of origination fees;

5)

Payment of accrued interest; and 6) Payment of principal indebtedness.

Prepa)'ments. Borrower may make a full prepayment or partial prepayments without paying any prepayment charge. The Note
Holder wil1 use Borrower prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal thn.t Borrower owes 1mder this Note. However. the
No1e Holder may apply the prepayment to the accrued and unpaid interest on the prepayment arnoun~ before applying the
prepayment to reduce 1he Principal amount of the Note. lf Borrower makes a partial prepa;rment, there will be no changes in the
due date or in the amount oft11e monthly payment unless the Note 1!older agrees in writing to those changes.
Default. Borrower will be in default ifar.y of the following happen: A) Borrower fails to make any payment when due; B) Any
Borrower dies, or becomes insolvent, a receiver is appointed for any part of any Borrower's property, ac"Jy Borrower makes an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or any proceeding is commenced either by any Borrower or against any Borrower under
any bankruptcy or insolvency laws; C) Any creditor tries to take any of Borrower's property or on which Nore Holder has a lien
or security interest; D) 1f all or any part of the collateral or Borrower or any interest in such is sold or transferred (or if a
controlling interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrowt:r is not a natural person) without Not= Holder's prior written
consent; and E) Upon defauitr interest on ~1e Note shall increase to one and a half percent (1.5%) per month, compounded
monthly. Interest shall remain at the default rate until the Note is paid in full.
Upon default. Note Holder may declare the entire 11npaid Total Indebtedness on this Note immediately due: without notice, Note
Holder shnll also have all remedies given by law or equity as well as oil remedies provided by any other contract documents
between Borrower and Note Holder.
·
Attorney Fees. If the Note is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, Borrower promises to pay reasonable attorney's
fees ond collection costs of the Note Holder, \\thed1er or not a suit is initiated. lf nn action is brought to collect all or any pan of
this sum. Borrower promises to pay to Note Holder such sum::t as tlle Court may fix as reasonable attorneys fees, at trial and on
appeal. Borrower nlso agrees to pay reasonable attorney fees and costs for bankruptcy proceedings (including efforts to modify
or vacate any automatic stay or irJunction), appeals, and any anticipated post-judgment collection services.
Co11ateral. As a material term of this Note, the Borrowers grant to tile Note Holder the immediate right to record aTidlor file
liens against all real and personal property currently held, or hereinafter acquired, by any or all Borrowers wilbout additional
signatures required by Borrowers.
Liability. BorrO'rver and all persons Hable or to become liable on this note waive presentment, demand, protest and notice of
demand, protest mid non-payment, and consent to any and all renewals and c,,.1ensions of1ime of payment renewals, waivers and
modifications hereof, and further expressJy waive and agree that the leans hereof jncluding time of payment or other tenns of
payment hereof, may be modified and/or security reduced without nffecting the liability of any party to the Note or any per.;on
liable or to become liable with respect to the indebtedness evidenced hereby.

l OFl

PRO.MlSSORY N'OTE
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Liability of each Borrower is joint and several to each Note Holder.
Wah'er. No waiver by either party, whetl1er expressed or implied, of any provision of tl1is Note or of any breach <Jr defau1t of
either party, shall constitute a continuing waiver of such provisions or n waiver of any other provision of this Note or of any
subseq_uent breach or·defuulL
It is hereby agreed th:.it in any e\lent any provision of this 'Note is determined to be invalid, that such provision shall not have any
effect t1pon the other provisions of said Note which shall remain in full force and effect.
This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utnh. excluding its conflict of laws

GfuJ

rules.

Borrower warrants by its signnrure that it voluntarily enters into this Note and the person signing on behalf of Borrower is
authorized to sign on behalf of such party.
Each representation and warranty contained herein or made pursuant hereto shall be: deemed to be material and to hnve been
relied upon, and shall survjve performwu-e
. of1his Note.
Any ootice hereunder shall be given by certiiied mail, return receipt rtquested, and shall be deemed effective upon receipt or

refusal of receipt if so sent to the address of Borrower as set out below:

NOTE HOLDER:
Custom Floor Coverings, Inc .• OBA Carpets of America
C/0 Mark Hancey, Hancey Law Offices

~

Ste. 200; l21 N. Gateway Drive
Providen<:e, UT 84332

Driver's License Number and Slate:

D2=23

Social Security Number:

~7J-~ 37

-J-34/

Dated l11is j..2_ dny of February, 2011

20F2

PROMISSORY NOTE
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When Recorded Mail To:
Mark B. Hancey
Hancey Lew Offices
121 N. Gateway Drive, Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
(435) 787-1444

~t1039270Bk16S9Pg37
Date: 23~Feb-201110:10 AH Fee $10.00
NOTICE OF LIEN

Cache County, UT
Kichael Gleed, Rec. - filed Bu 6C

For ttAHCEY LAW OFFICES
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by Mark Hancey, the undersigned acting as the duly authorized
limited agent for Custom Floor Covering, Inc. DBA Carpets of America, Jnc., hereinafter ~~ien Claimant''.
Said agent gives notice that Lien Claimant claims and maintains a Lien on certain real property owned by
Paul R and Andrea P. Lindstrom.

_ ·- ._ _1Jl~fJ!JlQUnt Qf.§~id Lien.is fi>r.~.e ~rincip~ SUill 9($14,§_85.1~,. to.&,etp.~_w,ith -~ in~~est rate o~
10o/o per annum, compounded monthly, beginning February 12, 2011 until paid in full, together with
additional costs of collection including reasonable attorney fees.
The basis for the Lien is a Promissory Note executed by Paul Lindstrom dated February 12, 2011,
which in part stated:
''Collateral. As a material tenn of this Note, the Borrowers grant to the Note Holder the
immediate right to record and/or file liens against all real and personal property currently
held, or hereinafter acquired, by any or all Borrowers without additional signature required by
Borrowers."
The certain real property owned by Paul R and Andrea P. Lindstrom subject to this lien is
descnoed as:
Parcel:
Address:
Legal:

..

01-103-0079
240 West 930 South; Paradise, Utah 84328
LOT 2 KE ETERSON SUBDMSION CONT 1.25 AC SUBJ TO UT.lllTY
EASE
SAS PER FINAL PLAT

···---··-- ··-· ··----

·-.
entof

g, Inc. DBA Carpets of America, Inc.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

County of Cache

)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this_&_ day ·of February 20 I 1, in witness thereo~ I have
hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal.
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When Recorded Mail To:
Mark B. Hancey, Hancey Law Offices
121 N. Gateway Drive, Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
(435) 787-1444

Ent 1045009 Bk 1670 Pg 1012

Date: 15-Jun-201112:38 PM Fee $10.00
Cache County, UT
CLARIFIED NOTICE OF LJEN

Hichael Gleed, Rec. - Filed By GC

For HANCEY LAW OFFICES

nns CLARIFIED NOTICE OF LIEN IS TO CLARIFY A NOTICE OF LIEN DATED FEBURARY 16, 2011,
RECORDED FEBURARY 23, 2011, AS ENTRY 1039270, BOOK 1659, PAGE 37 IN THE CACHE COUNTY
RECORDER'S OFFICE

~

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by Mark Hancey, the undersigned acting as the duly authorized limited
agent for Custom Floor Covering, Inc. DBA Carpets of America, Inc., hereinafter "Lien Claimant''. Said agent
gives notice that Lien Claimant claims and maintains a Lien as to Paul R Lindstrom's interest only on certain real
property, owned in part by Paul R. Lindstrom whose address is 240 W 93 00 S; Paradise, Utah 84328~ .
The amount of said Lien is for the p~cipal sum of $14,685.13, together with an interest rate of 10% per
annum, compounded monthly, beginning February 12, 2011 until paid in full., together with additional costs of
collection including reasonable attorney fees.
The certain real property, owned by Paul R. Lindstrom and Andrea P. Lindstrom, subject to this lien is
described as:
Parcel: 01-103-0079
Legal: LOT 2 KEN PETERSON SUBDMSION CONT 1.25 AC SUBJ TO UTILITY EASEMENTS AS PER FINAL PLAT
Claim asserts a Lien only against the interests of Paul R Lindstrom, not Andrea P. Lindstrom in saic;l property.

Lien Claimant asserts that this Lien is not required to comply with Utah Code Ann. §3 8-12-102 because,
interalia, this Lien is interest subject to a Security Agreement as defined in Utah Code Ann. §70A-9a-102.
Nevertheless, this Lien includes all information required in Utah Code Ann. §38~12-102(2).
ANotice of Lien copy will be sent via certified mail. The Article Number contained on the certified mail
receipt is 7010 1870 0002 9887 8750. The date the Notice of Lien was recorded is set forth in the Cache County
Recording stamp above. The name and address of the Lien Claimant is Custom Floor Covering, Inc. DBA Carpets
of America, Inc. % Hancey Law Offices; Suite 200; 121 N. Gateway Drive; Providence, Utah 84332
The basis for the Lien is a Promissory Note executed by Paul Lindstrom, as sole Borrower, dated February
12, 2011, which in part stated:
"Collateral. As a material term of this Note, the Borrowers grant to the Note~lder the immediate
right to record and/or file liens against all real and personal property currently held, or hereinafter
acquired, by any or all Borrowers without additional signature requiredy Borrowers."

STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache

)
:ss
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15ra day of June2011, in · ess thereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed my official seal.

r------------NOTARYPUBUC

(1)
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JANEECE CHRISTENSEN
579633
COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST 14, 2013

STATE OF UTAH

THIS JS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT. MY INFORMATION RECEIVED WILL BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.
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2/15/2011

Cache County
Tax Roll Report
Parcel Number: 01-103-0079
Taxpayer Name & Address

Owners

Parcel: 01-103-0079

1

LINDSTROM, PAUL R & ANDREA

"f

Entry: 721015 ~

721015 ~ (902/546)

Name: LINDSTROM PAUL R & ANDREA P
Address 1: P.O. BOX417

City, State,

Zip: PARADISE, UT84328-0417

Dis trlct: 002 PARADISE CITY

Property Address
Property
Address: 240W9300 S
Property City: PARADISE

Tax Rate:o.009904
Pursuant to state statute, the Assessor•s Office does not complete adjustments to the Tax Rolls until
May 21, 2011. Please be aware that any values for the Tax Year 2011 may change until that date.

Property Information
______ ;. 2011 -------

ACRES

MARKET

-----·· 2010 -------

TAXABLE

MARKET

TAXABLE

BR- BUILDING
RESIDENTIAL

0.00

174,458

95,950

174,458

95,950

LR-LAND

1.00

55,000

30,250

55,000

30,250

0.26

5,200

5,200 ·

5,200

5,200

1.26

234,658

131,400

234,658

131,400

RESIDEN116.L
LS- LAND

SECONDARY
TOTALS

Building & Tax Information
Square
Footage:

1613

2010Taxes:

$1,301.39

Year
BUIit:

1999

2011 Taxes:

$1,301.39

SFR

Special Tax:

$0.00

Abatements:

$0.00

Payments:

$0.00

Buildlng

Type:

Balance Due:

$1,301.39

Parcel History
l"n"f\•L-tn'l_nn~n ,.,,nr,. or:11.1

ir-t..1

RV~•

n-c1 ,~ ..... ,. ,... ,

a,ao-

Legal Description
by...
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
landlight.com/fl2_report_UT_Digitized
CA.asp ?p
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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2/15/2011

Landllght: Parcel Info Page
-----· 2011 ------

LOT 2 KEN PETERSON SUBDIVISION CONT 1.25 AC SUBJ TO UTILITY EASEM8'JTS AS PER ANAL PLAT
1d,

No Greenbelt Information.,..

,.. No Back Tax Owing.,..
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LandLight: Abstract Report

Abstract
Cache County
Parcel Number 01-103-0079

@

RICHER ARNOLD

~

Instrument
Consider

Grantees

Granters

sue TR

LINDSTROM 1 PAUL R &
ANDREA P

sue TR

RICHER ARNOLD

LINDSTROM 1 ANDREA 1
PETITIONER

LINDSTROM 1 PAUL
ROBERT RESPONDENT

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

CLARIFIED
CUSTOM FLOOR
NOTICE OF LIEN
COVERINGS INC OBA
CARPETS OF AMERICA INC, $14,685.13

1045009 ~
1670/1012

NOTICE OF LIEN
CUSTOM FLOOR
$14,685.13
COVERINGS INC OBA.
CARPETS OF AMERICA INC 1

1039270
1659/37

LINDSTROM! PAUL R &
ANDREA P

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P
CO. SUCTR,

(@
'

CITIFINANCIAL INC 1

Q,

~

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

1099540
1793/1506

DECREE OF
DIVORCE
$0.00

1Q46238
1673/64

HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
CORP IIL

(J

Glj

GI

854256
1283/1618

ld

DEED OF TRUST 852446
$20, 183.38
1280/1106

GI

PETERSON KENNETH M &
JOAN L

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH NA,

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL
NATIONAL BANKI sue TA,

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

AMERICAN SECURE TITLE

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

FULL
812871
RE CONVEYANCE
11941609
$0.00

12/09/2013
13:03

D.O.1.

Affected
Entry#

11/18/2013

1280/1106

~

~
12/09/2013
13:03

01/25/2013

1280/1106

JI

~
07/11/2011
16:46

01/05/2010

06/15/2011
12:38

06/15/2011

~

IJ

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL
NATIONAL BANKI sue TR.

Ia

lJ

DEED OF
854257
RECONVEYANCE
128311619
$0.00

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
CO SUCTR
$0.00

@

@

GIi

FU LL
1099541
RECONVEYANCE
179311509
$0.00

HOUSEHOLD FINANCE
CORPIII.

~

@

D.O.F.
T.O.F.

Entry#
Bk/Pg

DEED OF
848257
RECONVEYANCE
12741293
$0.00

GI

848256
1274/291

Uj

~
02/23/2011
10:10

1659/0037

~
_/_/_

ISi
02/12/2004
16:39

02/02/2004

~

lS]
02/12/2004
16:39

01/23/2004

1189/0262

~

~
01/20/2004
15:43

1189/0262

01/08/2003

[SJ
12/04/2003
11:09

10/31/2003

0576/0923

10/31/2003

0576/0923

IS]
12/04/2003
11 :09

~
02/05/2003
13:38

01/17/2003

~
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GI

CITIFINANCIAL INC,

LINDSTROM, PAUL R &
ANDREA P

LUNDBERG,JSCOTT
TR

Page 2 of 4

sue

DEED OF TRUST 811585
14 587 1
$ •
.4
1189/262

LINDSTROM 1 PAUL R &
ANDREA P

sue

EQUICREDIT CORP OF
AMERICA.

LUNDBERG, J SCOTT,
TR

AMERICAN SECURE TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY TR,

LINDSTROM, PAUL R &
ANDREA P

Q

795400
DEED OF
RECONVEYANCE
11231394
$0.00

01/27/2003
13:51

08/07/2002
13:44

FULL
793652 ~
RECONVEYANCE
11171469
$0.00

07/17/2002
10:12

Q

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS
INC.

DEED OF TRUST
789584
$204,250.00
1105/354

LINDSTROM, PAUL R &
ANDREA P

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL
UTAH INC

TRUST DEED
$200,000.00

LINDSTROM 1 PAUL R &
ANDREA P

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL
UTAH INC,

07/17/2002

0937/0426

06/20/2002

0937/0426

07/15/2002

1010/1051

~
08/07/2002
13:44

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

~

~

795399 ~
1123/393

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

01/23/2003

~

~
~

1§1
05/30/2002
14:48

(iJ

05/17/2002

~
®

FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL EQUICREDIT CORP OF
AMERICA,
CORP,

LINDSTROM. PAUL R &
ANDREA P

BANK OF UTAH TR.

TRUST DEED
$16,300.91

Ld

761520
1010/1052

761519~
1010/1051

ASSIGNMENT OF 748389
TRUST DEED
9701610
$0.00

DEED OF
736984
RECONVEYANCE
$0.00
941/15

LINDSTROM, PAUL R &
ANDREA P

FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL DEED OF TRUST 735581
CORP,
$184,000.00
9371426

PETERSON KENNETH M &
JOAN L

KEN PETERSON SUBD
*PLAT

SUBDIVISION
PLAT
$0.00

GI

05/23/2001
15:10

05/22/2001

[SJ
05/23/2001
15:09

05/22/2001

~

~
10/31/2000
11 :11

03/30/2000

0937/0426

04/20/2000
13:43

04/05/2000

0902/0548

03/29/2000
16:04

03/24/2000

[SJ

GI

~

~

GI

IS]

722342 F)
1999/1271

08/17/1999
16:31

07/14/1999

IS]
Gill

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

FIRST COMMERCE BANK,

LINDSTROM. ANDREA
PETERSON

LINDSTROM PAUL R &
ANDREA P

51

~
DEED OF TRUST
721016
$120,150.00
902/548

QUITCLAIM
DEED
$10.00

121015
902/546

GI

07/30/1999
16:49

07/30/1999

~
07/30/1999
16:48

07/30/1999

~

~

6iv
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PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOAN L

Page 3 of 4

LINDSTROM. ANDREA
PETERSON

Ld

QUIT CLAIM
DEED
$10.00

120003
900/229

QUITCLAIM
DEED
$10.00

720002 ~
900/228

QUITCLAIM
DEED
$10.00

716936
893/319

QUITCLAIM
DEED
$10.00

716935
893/318

07/19/1999
11 :38

07/19/1999

[SJ

(ii
PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOAN L

LINDSTROM ANDREA
PETERSON

~

PETERSON, KENNETH &
JOAN L

LINDSTROM, ANDREA
PETERSON

PETERSON, KENNETH &
JOANL

LINDSTROM, ANDREA
PETERSON

GI

ca

PETERSON KENNETH M &
JOANL

FIRST SECURITY BANK NA,

PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOAN L

NORTHERN TITLE
COMPANY, sue TR

LINDSTROM, ANDREA
PETERSON

PARTIAL
710862
RECONVEYANCE
$0.00
878/616

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

710861
878/614

QUITCLAIM
DEED
$10.00

708s14
873/380

07/19/1999

~
06/10/1999
15:22

06/09/1999

~

GI

06/10/1999
15:22

06/09/1999

03/29/1999
15:46

03/29/1999

0576/0923

03/10/1999

0576/0923

09/30/1993

0477/0189

~

(@
NORTHERN TITLE
COMPANY TR,

07/19/1999
11 :38

GI

[SJ

GI

03/29/1999
15:45

lSI

GI

02/26/1999
15:05

~

(@
Parcel Number 01-103-0060 is a PARENT of 01-103-0079, 1 generation from 01-103-0079
- ,_,_,._ :· ~~~-4,··-~

. ~,."

NORTHERN TITLE
COMPANY TR

v

_.;._..., :. •.

,...,

. ~x .. ,

~

·'-"-

<, ,. , . . •

PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOANL

@
PETERSON. KENNETH M &
JOAN L

~

"1j

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH NA

FIRSTFED AMERICA BANK
NKA,
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS
BANK TR.
FIRST FEDERALS & L
ASSOC FKA,

PETERSON KENNETH M &
JOANL

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH NA,

PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOAN L

PETERSON, KENNETH M &
JOANL

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF
UTAH NA

❖ S/

DEED OF
585370
RECONVEYANCE
$0.00
581 /21 0

Ld

GI

FULL
562063
RECONVEYANCE
532111 04
$0.00

TRUST DEED
$25,000.00

(Ji

535585
477/193

535584
477/189

•.

,-,.. "

10/05/1993
12:55

ISi

~
DEED OF TRUST
583305
$58,500.00
576/923

REQUEST FOR
NOTICE
S0.00

.,..•~~-~.:.-,

IJ

09/01/1993
09:53

08/26/1993

~
08/03/1992
14:24

07/15/1992

0148/0417

08/13/1990

0148/0417

ISi

08/14/1990
11 :29

IS]

GI

08/14/1990
11 :29

08/13/1990

~

Parcel Number 01-103-0079 is a PARENT to the following parcels:

@
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01-103-0060

End of Abstract - Parcel Number 01-103-0079
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PECK

Shaun L Peck, P.C.
Marty E. Moore, P.c.
Bretton K. Hadfield, P.C.
Brandon J. Baxter, P.C.
Daniel K. Watkins, P.C.

HADFIELD
l
I BAXTER &

I

MOORE

I .... -·-···.
Shawn P. Bailey
Keely Schneiter*
J. Aaron Jensen
Preston P. Frischlmecht*

.. ·-- . ·•-• ·-

399 North Main Street
Suite 3 00, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 787-9700
Telefax: (435) 787-2455
speck@peckhadfield.com

ATTORNEYS
With attorneys licensed to practice in Utah, Idaho,
Wyoming, Oregon, Virginia and Illinois

* Registered Patent
Attorney

·· -June 8, 2011

Mark Hancey
121 North Gateway Drive, No. 200
Providence, UT 84332

Re:

.A1.1.drea Ltnq~trom _and Custom Flo_or Cov~ring, Inc.

Dear Mark:
Please be advised that we represent the interests of Andrea Lindstrom in the following
matters.
I have been provided with a copy of a "Notice ofLien" executed and filed by you and Custom
Floor Covering, Inc. 011 Februaiy 23, 2011. The Notice, recorded as Entry No. 1039270 in Book
1659, Pg. 37 purports to give notice of a lien covering property owned by Paul Lindstrom and
Andrea Lindstro111 situated in Pfll'ag.ise, Utah. The Notice itself recognizes that the obligation claimed
to ·be supporting the· iien was executedbyPaulLindsti;oni:·There is-no mention of Andrea Lindstrom
having executed any such obligation, or any other document that would properly allow the claimed
lien. Please provide us with a copy of all documents related to this matter, including a copy of the
Promissoi-y Note you mention in the notice.
The purported lien is improper under Utah Code Sec. 38-9-1 in that the lien is not one
allowed by law,. and is not authorized by a joint owner of the property. This "Notice of Lien"
constitutes a wrongful lien under Utah law, and must be released within 10 days from the date of this
letter. Failure to do so will result in legal action against you and your client, and may subject you to
liabillty foi· attomey's fees and/or damages under Utal1 Code Sec. 38-9-4. We hope that this will not
be necessary,
and that you will promptly
the Notice.
·.
. .. . release
.
'

,'

A Limited Liability Company
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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To Mark Hancey
RE: Andrea Linstrom and Custom Floor Covering
June 8,201 I
Page2

Please let me know right away if you have any'questions concerning the foregoing. I will be
happy to discuss this matter with you. You will receive no further notice in advance of our filing a
complaint if the lien is not removed within the time required by law.

SLP/tw

~
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ffl

Hancey

[aw Offices

June 9, 2011

Shaun Peck
Ste 300; 300 N Main
Logan, Utah 84321

MARK 8. HANCEY
Suite 200
121 N. Gateway Drive
Providence, Utah 84332

Phone: (435) 787-1444
Fax: (435) 755-5152
www.hancev.com

RE:

Lindstrom/ Customer Floor Coverings, Inc.

Dear Shaun,

Email: law@hancey.com

I received your letter of June 8, 2011 regarding the above stated matter. I have attached a
copy of the Promissory Note executed by Mr. Lindstrom.
Given the language of the Note, I believe the Lien is proper as to Paul Lindstrom's interest
in the property. Please call me at your earliest convenience to discuss any remaining
concerns you have regarding Utah Code Ann. §3 8-9-1.
Sincerely,

Mark Hancey
MBH/jc
Attachment

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~

Hancey

[aw Offices

June 15, 2011
ShaunLPeck
399N. Main
Suite 300, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
E-mail: speck@peckhadfield.com

M.wcHANCEY

Letter dated June 8th 2011/Paul Lindstrom Lien Issue

RE:
Suite200

121 N. Gateway Drive
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone 435.787..1444
Facsimile 435-755-5152
www.hancey.com
law@hancey.com

Dear Shaun,

I have had a chance to review the Centennial Investment v Nuttall case you referenced in our
phone conversation on Friday.
I do not believe Centennial relates to the issue between our clients. Centennial dealt with
enforceability of a REPC to sell an entire parcel. Also the divorce decree in Centennial required
the joint tenant to mutually agree to any sale of the property. When the buyer claimed an
alternative remedy that the REPC was enforceable against the sole signing joint tenant, the court
said it was undisputed that Ce11tennial [buyer] offered to purchase and Brook [one joint tenant]
offered to sell the entire interest of the Herriman property. The court would not rewrite the
contract for a sale of half the property. Centennial is a statute of frauds case, standing for the
proposition that in order to sell the entire interest ofjointly held property, both owners need to
sign the contract.
In our matter, the collateral provision in the note only provides a lien on Paul's interest in real and
personal property-including his interest in the residence.
In regards to rights of creditors against jointly held property, Utah Code Ann. §78B..S-512 is also
illustrative. It states:

If an individual and another own property in this state as joint tenants or tenants in
common, a creditor of the individual, subject to the individual's right to claim an
exemption under this part, may obtain a levy on and sale of the interest of the individual
in the property. A creditor who has obtained a levy, or a purchaser who has purchased
the individual's interest at the sale, may have the property partitioned or the individual's
interest severed.
If a creditor can claim an involuntary lien against a joint tenant's interest in property, certainly a
creditor can maintain a voluntary lien in joint tenant property.
If you have any other relevant citations disputing my reasoning, I would. be happy to reconsider

Sincerely,

~'11-,v. -

fflY~·
~-~

Mark Hancey

_,,

,,,

f
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399 North Main Street
Suite 300, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 787-9700
Telefax: (435) 787-2455
speck@peckhadfield.com

ATTORNEYS
With attorneys licensed to practice in Utah, Idaho,
Wyoming, Oregon, Virginia and Illinois

* Registered Patent
Attorney

•
•
•
•

July 12, 2011

Mark Hancey
121 North Gateway Drive, No. 200
Providence, UT 84332
Re:

Andrea Lindstrom and Cu~tom Floor Covering, Inc.

Dear Mark:
After further review of the lien matter in tb.~s case, we have found that Paul did not have any
equitable title to the real property by virtue of the Lindstrom's Decree of Divorce entered January
5. 2011. In the divorce, Andrea was awarded the real property free and clear of any interest to Paul.
Therefore, when Paul executed the Promissory Note on February 12, 2011, he did not have title to,
or the ability to authorize you to attacli"the real property at issue.
Importantly, th~_P.ronussaiy Note d9es not specifically mention the real property. Rather, it
. refers to j:,lbpeny o-wn_ed by ivL:. Lincistrom.. r don,y beiieve a court Wlil_enforc"e any such agreement
.again Ms. Lindstrom's ~quitable owii.ership in the prope1ty. . Where Mr. Lindstrom had no interest,
your lien continues to be wrongful.
Thaitlc you.

A Limited Liability Company

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58

ffl

Hancev

July 20, 2011

ShaunLPeck

I:aw Offices

399N.Main

MARK HANCEY

Suite 300, Third Flqor
Logan, Utah 84321
speck@peckhadfield.com

Suite 200

121 N. Gateway Drive ·
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone 435-787-1444
Facsimile 435-755-5152
www.hancey.com
law@hancey.com

Dear Shaun,

I have taken some additional time looking at the Stipulated Divorce Decree ("Decree") and
related matters. Based upon what I have found, the Decree is not the effectuating document
transferring property. As a matter of practice, every attorney I have spoken with has confirmed
that the Decree is simply a letter of instruction infonning the parties of what must be done. Only
through the subsequent creation and recording of the Deed does the conveyance occur.

In support of that point, the Decree does not even refer to a legal description of any property that
would allow the Decree to be recorded without further instruction. fu the same way, the Decree
would not modify retirement benefits, insurance matters, or tax filings; it simply provides
instructions on how subsequent documents should be created.
Simply put, Andrea and/or her attorney should have gone through the effort of completing the
necessary documents to effectuate the Decree; and, second gone to the effort of recording those
documents to give notice to third parties.
Even ifwe were to assume the Decree, in and of itself, constituted a conveyance, the fact that it
was not recorded until after my client's lien was recorded brings into effect Utah's priority statute
of Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102.
Again, I would ask that your client work with us in trying to obtain payment by Mr. Lindstrom
for the account balance. We would welcome your assistance in that effort.
It is clear that there was no actual notice of the Decree. In fact, your Jw1e 8, 2011 notice refers to
Paul Lindstrom as ajoint owner of the property.
My client informs me that Mr. Lindstrom may have some inheritance which could be used to
satisfy the debt. Your assistance in identifying those assets may help resolve this matter entirely.

-~-qr

Sine~
I

.

~/.

Mark Hancey
:MBH/jc
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Shaun L Peck, P.C.
Marty E. Moore, P.C.
Bretcon K. Hadfield, P.C.
Brandon J. Baxter, P.C.
Daniel K. Watkins, ?.C.
Shawn P. Bailey, r.c.

399 North Main Street
Suite 300, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 787-9700
Telefax: (435) 787-2455
speck@peckhadfield.com

ATTORNEYS

Craig L Winder
Matthew David Lorz

W it h attorney.; licensed to practice in Utah, Idaho,
Wyoming, Oregon, and Washington

February 5, 2014

•

Mark Hancey
121 North Gateway Drive, No. 200
Providence, UT 84332

Re:

•

Andrea Lindstrom and Custom Floor Covering, Inc.

Dear Mark:
Our recent review of this file indicates that your client has not yet removed hi s wrongful lien.
Please advise your client that if the lien is not promptly removed, we will file suit, and will seek
attorney's fees and other remedies allowed by law. Thank you .

•
•

SLP/tw
Encl.

•

•

A Limited Liability Company
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Shaun L Peck, P.C.
Marty E. Moore, P.C.
Bretton K. Hadfield, P.C.
Brandon]. Baxter, P.C.
Daniel K. \Vackins, P.C.
Shawn P. Bailey, r.c.

HADFIELD '
BAXTER &
MOORE

399 North Main Street
Suite 300, Third Floor
Logan, Ucah 8432 1
Tc.cphone: (435) 787-9700
Telefax: (435) 787-2455
speck@peckhadfielcl.com

AT T O R N EYS

Craig L Winder

Matthew David Lorz
With attorneys licensed to practice in Utah, Idaho,
Wyom ing, Oregon, and W ash ington

February 11 , 2014

Mark Hancey
121 North Gateway Drive, No. 200
Providence, UT 84332

Re:

Andrea Lindstrom and Custom Floor Covering, Inc.

Dear Mark:
I have reviewed your response to om Jetter of february 5, 2014. The case you cite is
inapposite as the underlying document in that case was a trnst deed, a valid 1ien-creating document.
Please tell me what document you have that creates a lien recognized by law, as well as the particular
statutory provision or case that allows your particular type of document or clause to create a lien.
Yom UCC cite is also unhelpful, as the UCC section you refer to pertains to personal property, not
real property. In addition to creating a wrongful lien, your filing also constitutes slander of title.
You were informed long ago that Mr. Lindstrom had no interest in or equitable title to the property
at the time your lien was filed. I am providing you .vi th a copy of the divorce decree indicating as
much. You recognize that your fil ing creates a cloud on Mrs. Lindstrom's title, regardless of your
reference to Mr. Lindstrom's interest only. You know that Mr. Lindstrom had no interest at the time
of filing, With this knowledge, the failure to remove the cloud on Mrs. Lindstrom's title can only
be malicious. Although the knowledge of an agent is imputed to the client, we ask that you provide
a copy of tl1is letter to your client. Jfthe lien is not removed within ten (I 0) days of the date of this
letter, we will be filing a complaint. We have now given plenty of warning, and 1 hope your client
understands that he may be responsible for damages, i11cluding attorney's fees.
~=ely,

SLP/tw
Encl.
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[aw Offices
MARK B. HANCEY
Suite 200
121 N. Gateway Drive
Providence, Utah 84332
Phone: (435) 787-1444
Fax: (435) 755-5152
wv-M.hanceylaw.com
Email: mark@hancey.com

February 21, 2014

Shaun Peck
399 N. Main Street
Ste. 300
Logan Utah 84321
speck@peckhadfield.com

RE:

Andrea Lindstrom and Custom Floor Coverings

Dear Shaun,
The basis for my client's lien is a signed promissory note dated February 12, 2011 signed
by Paul Lindstrom. We have previously sent you this document. The key provision
states:
Collateral. As a material term of this Note, the Borrowers grant to Note Holder the
immediate right to record and/or file liens against all real and personal property currently
held, or hereinafter acquired, by any or all Borrowers without additional signatures
required by Borrowers.

Pursuant to this authorization, my client recorded a notice oflien dated February 23, 2011
as Entry 1039270, Book 1659, Page 37. We later clarified through a recorded document
that the lien was only asserted against Paul's interest in the property. I note that this
clarification was recorded well before any discussion of the divorce decree or the
recording thereof.
A review of our prior communications shows an interesting progression of allegations.
In your initial correspondence dated June 8, 2011, you state that the lien was not
"authorized by a joint owner of the property." Then, in your email of June 15, 2011, you
referred to them as 'Joint tenants" and questioned their ability to grant a lien on jointly
held property.
I contend a joint tenant has such a right. See Franklin Credit v Hanney, 262 P.3d 406,
2011 UT App 213; "it is well-settled that "a partial owner may sell or encumber her
share." Belnap v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 627 P.2d 47, 48 (Utah 1981).... This is true
even when the joint tenants are husband and wife."
The Franklin Court then refers to Clearfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622,624 (Utah
1977):
Where a husband and wife hold property so acquired as joint owners, either may transfer his interest
in the property so held without affecting the interest of the other. Since the rights of each spouse are
alienable, any purchaser or encumbrancer does not become a joint tenant in the property, but
becomes a tenant-in-common with the remaining spouse.

~

It wasn't until your letter of July 12, 2011 that you first discussed the existence of the
divorce decree. I noted that fact in my email response dated July 13, 2011. This
disclosure lead to our discussions regarding whether a divorce decree alone acts to transfer
property; or if a subsequent instrument is necessary.
Our contention all along is that the signing of the divorce decree alone does not effectuate
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the transfer of the property by itself. I would also point out that the decree as provided
does not reference any legal description of the property as required by U.C.A. §57-3105(2).
This very issue was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d
352, 353 (Utah 1991 ). Therein, the Court noted that the divorce decree was not an
effectuating document in part because, ,.. the divorce decree had not been recorded, nor had
Stephen Holt formally deeded the property to Kathy Holt".
This reasoning has direct correlations to facts we are dealing with. My client's notice of
lien was recorded nearly six months before any document purporting to transfer Paul's
interest in the property was recorded.

U.C.A. §57-3-102, further supports the necessity of recording to impart notice. There was
no constructive notice of the divorce decree. This is borne out by your own June 8th , 2011
notice, wherein you claimed the Lindstrom's to be joint owners.

~

My client does not bear the consequences of fact that six months lapsed between the
apparent signing of the divorce decree and the recording thereof.
As previously mentioned, we are willing to discuss resolution to this matter that does not
include release of the lien (absent payment), and if monies can be collected from Paul then
both of our clients can be made whole.

Gil

Sincerely,

Mark Hancey
MBH/bg
~
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January 12, 2015

Shaun Peck
Ste 300; 300 N. Main
Logan, UT 84321

MARKHANCBY

~

RE:

Suite 200

121 N. Gateway 1)rive
Providence, Utah 84332
Telephone 435-787-1444
Facsimile 435-755-5152
www.hancey.com
law@hnncey.com

Lindstrom/ Custom Floor Coverings, Inc.

Dear Shaun,
This Is to confirm on letterhead the offer previously made by my client that they are "agreeable
and principle to subordinate Its lien to a refi provided the refi would not Increase the balance of
the loan on the property". I also state that we need to talk details if this has an interest to your
client. I point out that this would allow your client to refinance her property now while my client
pursues Mr. Lindstrom. You have responded by stating, "Mark, No thanks. We cannot accept a
resolution that leaves a lien on the property."
Please let me know if your cl lent changes her mind and wishes to pursue such a refinance of the
property.

Sincerely,

Mark B. Hancey

MBH/ks
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.,

ATTORNEYS
With attorneys licensed to practice in Utah, Idaho,
Wyoming, Oregon, and North Dakota

January 13, 2015

i I

Sent via U.S. post and e-mail
Mark B. Hancey
Hancey Law Offices
121 N. Gateway Drive
Suite 200
Providence, Utah 84332
law@hancey.com

Re:

•

Andrea Lindstrom

Dear Mark,
I appreciate your client's offer to subordinate his lien. However, it is unacceptable to
have a cloud on our client's title. T hat is like leaving mud on her wall and temporarily painting
over it. Moreover, my experience tells me most traditional lenders will not accept a
subordination of this sort for a tnditional home loan. If you know of any who will, please let us
know. Is there any resolution of this matter acceptable to yom client that results in removal of
the lien, short of my client paying the lien in the event Mr. Lindstrom does not? If so, please let
me know right away. Thank you.

SLP/tw
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Shaun L. Peck (#7595)
John D. Luthy (#8880)
PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC
399 N. Main Street, Suite 300
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (435) 787-9700
Facsimile: (435) 787-2455
Email: speck(@peckhadfield.com
Email: iluthy@peckhadfield.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, ST A TE OF UTAH

ANDREA P. LINDSTROM,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT
(Tier 2)

V.

PAUL R. LINDSTROM and CUSTOM
FLOOR COVERING, INC. dba CARPETS
OF AMERICA, INC.

Case No.

-------

Judge: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Defendants.
~

Plaintiff Andrea P. Lindstrom, through counsel, complains against Defendants as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
].

Mrs. Andrea P. Lindstrom is an individual residing in Cache County, Utah.

2.

Mrs. Lindstrom owns real property in Paradise, Cache County, Utah, which

property is identified by tax identification number O1-103-0079 (the "Home'}

3.

Mr. Paul R. Lindstrom is an individual whose current whereabouts are unknown

and whose last-known residence was in St. George, Utah.
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4.

Custom Floor Covering~ Inc. dba Carpets of America, Inc. ("Carpets of America")

is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Cache County, Utah.
5.

The causes of action alleged herein arise out of competing claims of legal or

equitable interest in the Home that are or may be asserted by the parties.
6.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-5-

l 02( l) and 78B-6-401.
7.

Venue is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-30 I ( 1)(b) and

788-3-307( l) & (2).

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8.

On July 30, 1999, Mrs. Lindstrom transferred the Home by quit claim deed to her

then husband, Mr. Lindstrom, and herself as joint tenants.
9.

The Home is LOT 2 KEN PETERSON SUBDIVISION CONT 1.25 AC SUBJ

TO UTILITY EASEMENTS AS PER FINAL PLAT and is more particularly described as
follows:
Legal Descr.: PART OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 33,
TOWNSHIP 10 NORTH, RANGE l EAST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN, DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY LINE OF 9300
SOUTH STREET LOCATED SOUTH 00°16'25" WEST 99.00 FEET AND
SOUTH 89°31 '55" WEST 404.35 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER
OF BLOCK 4, PLAT ''A" OF PARADISE TOWNSITE SURVEY; THENCE
SOUTH 0°28'05" EAST 296.52 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89°57'31" WEST
159.30 FEET; THENCE NORTH 11 °33'35" WEST 159.00 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 4°34'05" WEST 139.40 FEET; THENCE NORTH 89c31'55" EAST
199.85 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. TO BE KNOWN AS LOT 2,
KEN PETERSON SUBDIVISION.
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I 0.

On January 5, 20 I 0, Mr. and Mrs. Lindstrom divorced.

11.

In the Stipulated Decree of Divorce. the court ordered that Mrs. Lindstrom "shall

be awarded the [H]ome free and clear of any interest to [Mr. Lindstrom].''
12.

The Stipulated Decree of Divorce was not recorded when it was issued.

13.

The Stipulated Decree of Divorce did not order Mr. Lindstrom to furnish Mrs.

Lindstrom with a deed, and he provided her with no deed.
14.

On or about February 12, 2011, Mr. Lindstrom executed a Promissory Note for

payment to Carpets of America in the amount of $14,685.13.
15.

In the Promissory Note, Mr. Lindstrom agreed to ··grant [Carpets of America] the

immediate right to record and/or file liens against all real and personal property currently held, or
hereinafter acquired, by [Mr. Lindstrom]."
16.

The Promissory Note was not signed by Mrs. Lindstrom, and the debt to which it

referred was not incurred for household purposes or for improvements to the Home.
17.

On or about February 23, 20 I I, Carpets of America, through its attorney,

recorded a Notice of Lien upon the Home.
18.

On June 8, 2011, Mrs. Lindstrom, through counsel, sent a letter to Carpets of

America, observing that the Promissory Note on which the Notice of Lien was based ··was
executed by Paul Lindstrom'" and that '"[t]here is no mention of Andrea Lindstrom having
executed any such obligation:·
19.

In response, on June I 5, 2011, Carpets of America, through its attorney, recorded

a Clarified Notice of Lien upon the Home.
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20.

The Clarified Notice of Lien stated that Carpets of America's lien was "only

against the interests of Paul R. Lindstrom, not Andrea P. Lindstrom in [the Home],'' and it
purported to be authorized by the Promissory Note.
21.

On July 11, 2011, Mrs. Lindstrom, through counsel, recorded the Stipulated

Decree of Divorce with a legal description of the Home attached.
22.

On February 11.2014, Mrs. Lindstrom, through counsel, sent another letter to

Carpets of America, stating in part:
You were infonned long ago that Mr. Lindstrom had no interest in or equitable
title to the property at the time your lien was filed. I am providing you with a copy
of the divorce decree indicating as much. You recognize that your filing [of the
Clarified Notice of Lien] creates a cloud on Mrs. Lindstrom's title, regardless of
your reference to Mr. Lindstrom's interest only .... If the lien is not removed
within ten ( I 0) days of the date of this letter, we will be filing a complaint.

~

Carpets of America never removed the Notice of Lien or the Clarified Notice of
Lien.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Declaratory Judgment
24.

Mrs. Lindstrom incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged

25.

Mrs. Lindstrom is entitled to a declaratory judgment of this Court that when the

herein.

Stipulated Decree of Divorce was entered by the court on January 5, 20 I 0, it immediately
divested Mr. Lindstrom of his interest in the Home, notwithstanding that he gave Mrs. Lindstrom
no deed and the Stipulated Decree of Divorce was not recorded until July 11, 2011.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Declaratory Judgment

26.

Mrs. Lindstrom incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged

27.

Mrs. Lindstrom is entitled to a declaratory judgment of this Court that when

herein.

Carpets of America's Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded against Mr.
Lindstrom's purported interest in the Home, Mr. Lindstrom's interest was at best a naked paper
title, divested in the divorce action and to which Carpets of America's lien could not and did not
attach, regardless of whether the Stipulated Decree of Divorce was recorded.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Quiet Title

28.

Mrs. Lindstrom incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged

29.

Mrs. Lindstrom is entitled to a decree of this Court (a) that when the Stipulated

herein.

Decree of Divorce was entered on January 5, 2010, it severed any joint tenancy interest that Mr.
Lindstrom had in the Home and eliminated any ownership interest he otherwise might have
retained in the Home, (b) that since January 5, 2010, Mrs. Lindstrom has owned the Home free
and clear of any interest of Mr. Lindstrom, and (c) that she now owns the Home free and clear of
any interest of Mr. Lindstrom.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Quiet Title

30.

Mrs. Lindstrom incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged

herein.
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31.

Mrs. Lindstrom is entitled to a decree of this Court (a) that Carpets of America's

Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien do not encumber Mrs. Lindstrom's interest or any
other interest in the Home, (b) that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien never
attached to any interest in the Home, and (c) that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien
are not now attached to the home or to any interest in the home.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Mrs. Lindstrom prays this Court for relief as follows:
A.

For a declaratory judgment of this Court that when the Stipulated Decree of

Divorce was entered by the court on January 5, 20 I 0, it immediately divested Mr. Lindstrom of
his interest in the Home, notwithstanding that he gave Mrs. Lindstrom no deed and the Stipulated
Decree of Divorce was not recorded until July 11, 2011;
8.

For a declaratory judgment of this Court that when Carpets of America's Notice

of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded against Mr. Lindstrom's purported interest in
the Home, Mr. Lindstrom's interest was at best a naked paper title, divested in the divorce action
and to which Carpets of America's lien could not and did not attach, regardless of whether the
Stipulated Decree of Divorce was recorded;
C.

For a decree of this Court (a) that when the Stipulated Decree of Divorce was

entered on January 5, 2010, it severed any joint tenancy interest that Mr. Lindstrom had in the
Home and eliminated any ownership interest he otherwise might have retained in the Home, (b)
that since January 5, 2010, Mrs. Lindstrom has owned the Home free and clear of any interest of
Mr. Lindstrom. and (c) that she now owns the Home free and clear of any interest of Mr.
Lindstrom;
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D.

For a decree of this Court (a) that Carpets of America's Notice of Lien and

Clarified Notice of Lien do not encumber Mrs. Lindstrom's interest or any other interest in the
Home, (b) that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien never attached to any interest in
the Home, and (c) that the Notice of Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien are not now attached to
~

the home or to any interest in the home;
E.

For costs of court; and

F.

For such further relief as the Court deems just.

DA TED this 11th day of December, 2015.
PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC

Isl John D. Luthv
ShaunL. Peck
John D. Luthy

Attorneys.for Plaint[ff
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Mark Hancey (USB 06884)
HANCEY LAW OFFICES
Ste. I 10; 595 S. Riverwoods Parkway
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 787-1444
E-mail: mark@hanceylaw.com

Attorneyfor Defendant

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANDREA P. LINDSTROM,
Plaintiff.
V.

PAUL R. LINDSTROM and CUSTOM
FLOOR COVERING, INC. dba
CARPETS OF AMERICA, INC.
CFCs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
OF CUSTOM FLOOR COVERING,
INC. DBA CARPETS OF AMERICA,
INC.

Case No. 150100495
Judge: Thomas Willmore

COMES NOW Custom Floor Covering. Inc. dba Carpets of America, Inc. (hereinafter
"CFC"), by and through counsel, Mark Hancey, and hereby responds to the Complaint of Andrea
P. Lindstrom (hereinafter "Plaintiff") and counterclaims against Andrea P. Lindstrom as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
1.

CFC alleges Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against CFC upon which

relief may be granted.
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SECOND DEFENSE
2.

As to Paragraph 1, CFC does not have sufficient information to confirm or deny and

therefore denies.
3.

As to Paragraphs 2, CFC admits.

4.

As to Paragraph 3, CFC does not have sufficient information to confirm or deny and

therefore denies.

5.

As to Paragraph 4, CFC admits.

6.

As to Paragraph 5, CFC admits.

7.

As to Paragraph 6, CFC admits.

8.

As to Paragraph 7, CFC admits.

9.

As to Paragraph 8, CFC does not have sufficient information to confirm or deny and

therefore denies.
10.

As to Paragraph 9. CFC admits.

11.

As to Paragraph 10, CFC does not have sufficient information to confirm or deny and

therefore denies.
12.

As to Paragraph 1 L CFC admits the document speaks for itself and must be interpreted in

its entirety. but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint Paragraph 11.
13.

As to Paragraph 12, CFC admits.

14.

As to Paragraph 13. CFC admits the document speaks for itself and must be interpreted in

its entirety, but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint Paragraph 13.
15.

As to Paragraphs 14, CFC denies.
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16.

As to Paragraphs 15, CFC denies.

17.

As to Paragraph 16, CFC admits that the Promissory Note was not signed by Mrs.

Lindstrom, however the CFC does not have sufficient information to confirm or deny whether or
not the debt referenced was incurred for household purposes of for improvements to the Home.
Issue for trial.
18.

As to Paragraphs 17, CFC admits that the document speaks for itself and must be

interpreted in its entirety, but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint.
19.

As to Paragraph 18, CFC admits the document speaks for itself and must be interpreted in

its entirety, but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint Paragraph 18.
20.

As to Paragraph 19, CFC admits the document speaks for itself and must be interpreted in

its entirety, but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint Paragraph 19.
21.

As to Paragraph 20. CFC admits the document speaks for itself and must be interpreted in

its entirety, but CFC denies all other allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint Paragraph 20.
22.

As to Paragraph 21, CFC admits.

23.

As to Paragraph 22. CFC admits that the letter was sent on February 11, 2014. however

the letter must be interpreted as a whole. The letter also must be interpreted in light of the
multitude of documents and correspondence between the parties including correspondence
wherein Mrs. Lindstrom, by and through counsel, confirmed that both Mr. and Mrs. Lindstrom
were joint tenants on the property.
24.

As to Paragraph 23, CFC admits.

25.

As to Paragraph 24, CFC incorporates previous responses.
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26.

As to Paragraph 25, CFC denies.

27.

As to Paragraph 26, CFC incorporates previous responses.

28.

As to Paragraph 27, CFC denies.

29.

As to Paragraph 28, CFC incorporates previous responses.

30.

As to Paragraph 29, CFC denies.

31.

As to Paragraph 30, CFC incorporates previous responses.

32.

As to Paragraph 31, CFC denies.

33.

As to Paragraph A, CFC denies.

34.

As to Paragraph B, CFC denies.

35.

As to Paragraph C, CFC denies.

36.

As to Paragraph D, CFC denies.

37.

As to Paragraph E, CFC denies.

38.

As to Paragraph F, CFC denies.
THIRD DEFENSE

39.

CFC alleges Plaintiffs claims, or some of them, are barred as speculative and imprecise

and are not recoverable by law.
FOURTH DEFENSE
40.

CFC alleges Plaintiff claims, or some of them, has failed to mitigate their damages and to

the extent that they failed to do so, their claims are barred.
FIFTH DEFENSE
41.

CFC alleges that Plaintiffs claims, or some of them. are barred by an estoppel.
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SIXTH DEFENSE
42.

CFC alleges that Plaintiff's claims, or some of them, are barred because of the Statute of

Frauds.

•
SEVENTH DEFENSE

43.

CFC alleges that Plaintiff had knowledge of, consented to, and/or ratified any and all acts

of CFC complained of by Plaintiff.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
44.

CFC alleges that Plaintiff's claims, or some of them, are barred by prior title.
NINTH DEFENSE

45.

Plaintiffs purported damages, if any, are the result of its own negligence or fault, and as

such, Plaintiff is precluded from recovery of the same. Such negligence includes but is not
limited to failure to record any document giving notice of the Lindstrom's Divorce Decree.
TENTH DEFENSE
46.

As affirmative defense, Plaintiffs claims are barred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-3-

102 & 103.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
47.

CFC incorporates by reference any and all additional defenses asserted by all other

defendants.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
48.

CFC reserves the right to raise such additional matters as may constitute a bar, avoidance

or affirmative defense under Rule 8 or 12 of the Utah R. Civ. P. which may be revealed or
~
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discovered hereafter during discovery.

COUNTERCLAIM
As a Counterclaim, CFC complains against Andrea P. Lindstrom as follows:
DESIGNATION OF TIER
1.

CFC pleads that their damages fall under Tier 2.
DESIGNATION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION

2.

Plaintiffs' counsel, as the person filing this record with the court, certifies that upon

information and belief all nonpublic information has been omitted or redacted from this public
record, including such nonpublic information as may be indentified in the attached and
accompanying exhibits.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

Consistent with the allegations raised herein. jurisdiction and venue are proper before this

Court.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

Paul Lindstrom owed Custom Floor Covering. Inc., dba Carpets of America, Inc.

(hereinafter "CFC") a large amount of money to cover several orders of flooring materials.
5.

Mr. Lindstrom used revenue generated from sale of flooring materials received from CFC

to pay Lindstrom family and household expenses.
6.

Mr. Lindstrom and CFC negotiated to resolve this debt which culminated in the signing

of the Promissory Note dated February 12, 2011 for $14,685.13 "Note''.
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7.

The Note effectively delayed CFC's collection of the amount owing in exchange for

collateralizing the debt.
8.

At the time the Note was signed Mr. Lindstrom was listed as a record title holder to a

parcel of property in Paradise Utah - Tax Id. No. 01-103-0079 (hereinafter "Paradise Lot").
9.

Jason Ward, the President of CFC, knew of this asset and relied on it in agreeing to the

terms of this Note.
10.

Based on that reliance, CFC instructed its legal counsel to prepare and record on its

behalf a Notice of Lien to secure the Note against the Paradise Lot.
11.

The lien was recorded on February 23, 2011, Book 1659, Page 37, and Entry

Number! 039270 "Lien".
12.

Once again, at the time the Lien was filed, Paul Lindstrom was still listed as a record title

holder to the Paradise Lot. See Cache County Tax Roll Report dated February 15, 2011 showing
the Paradise Lot is vested in "LINDSTROM PAUL R & ANDREA P".

13.

Over 100 days later, Andrea Lindstrom, through counsel, sent the June 8, 2011 Notice.

That letter referenced "property owned by Paul Lindstrom and Andrea Lindstrom." And it used
the phrase "joint owner of the property.'·
14.

CFC also immediately recorded its "Clarified Notice of Lien" on June 15, 2011 Book

1670 Page 1012 Entry Number 1045009. That document specifically claimed "a lien as to Paul R
Lindstrom's interest only".
15.

These initial letters were just the first exchanges in many written exchanges between

counsels for the Parties.
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16.

Initially Petitioner argued the inability of a co-tenant to encumber jointly held property.

17.

It was not until the July 12, 2011 letter where Petitioner's own attorney claimed to have

recently learned of the Divorce Decree.
18.

The disclosure of the Divorce Decree prompted an exchange of letters addressing Utah's

race-notice statutes and the efficacy (or lack thereof) of an unrecorded divorce decree to convey
title against a good faith purchaser of a security interest in the same property.
19.

It is undisputed that:
a) Paul Lindstrom signed the Note.

~

b) The Note authorized CFC to file liens against Paul Lindstrom's real property
interest.
c) When the Note was signed, Paul Lindstrom was listed as a record title holder to

~

the Paradise Lot.
d) When the Lien and ·'Clarified notice of Lien" were recorded with the Cache
(j

County Recorder's Office. Paul Lindstrom was still identified as the record title
holder to the Paradise Lot.
e) CFC only seeks a lien on the interest of the parcel held by Paul R. Lindstrom and

{;j

asserts no claim in the interest of the property held by Andrea Lindstrom.
20.

CFC negotiated in good faith with Mr. Lindstrom and exchanged good and valuable

consideration in the execution of the Note. As such, CFC is a bona fide purchaser of its
consensual lien.
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21.

Mrs. Lindstrom had the opportunity to record a Lis pendens at the initiation of the divorce

proceedings, or record the Divorce Decree itself once entered, or a myriad of other recordings
that would place the public on notice of her claim - she did not.
22.

CFC should not beat the consequences of the fact that six (6) months lapsed between the

apparent signing of the Divorce Decree and any effort on Plaintiffs part to do anything about it.
23.

Judge Willmore, in Case Number 140100438, has previously made certain factual

findings that should be binding upon parties. Bindings include the following:
a) The Stipulated Decree of Divorce was not recorded until July 11, 2011.
b) Mr. Lindstrom was stil I listed as a joint owner of the Paradise Lot at the time that
CFC recorded its liens.
c) There is no recorded notice that Mr. Lindstrom had been divested of his
ownership interest in the Paradise Lot that would have put CFC on notice.
d) CFC did not know about the Stipulated Decree of Divorce until both notices of
lien had been recorded.

COUNTERCLAIM CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
24.

CFC incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged herein.

25.

CFC is entitled to a declaratory judgment of this Court as follows:
a) A co-owner can encumber their interest in joint property.
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b) CFC acquired its lien on the Paradise Lot in good faith and good and valuable
consideration.
~

c) CFC was as a good faith purchaser in regards to its Note and Clarified Notice of
Lien.
d) At the time the promissory Note was entered into, between CFC and Mr.

~

Lindstrom, the Lindstrom's Stipulated Decree of Divorce had not been recorded.
e) At the time the Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded, the Lindstrom's
Stipulated Decree of Divorce had not been recorded.

lil
f)

CFC's Lien and Clarified Notice of Lien were recorded before Plaintiff's asserted
claim in Mr. Lindstrom's portion of the Paradise Lot.

I.@

g) CFC' s claim is that of a consensual lien holder, not a judgment lien holder.
h) That the Stipulated Decree of Divorce between the Lindstroms, having not been
recorded until July 11,201 I, is void against CFC Clarified Notice of Lien
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103.
i) That Plaintiffs Stipulated Decree of Divorce is not an effectuating document
transferring title absent either a formal deed being recorded or the Stipulated
Decree of Divorce being recorded.
j) That the Plaintiff's Stipulated Decree of Divorce fails to identify the Paradise Lot
and cannot be effectuated in the transfer thereof.

~
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - QUIET TITLE
26.

CFC incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully alleged herein.

27.

CFC is entitled to Quiet Title as follows:
a) CFC's Clarified Notice of Lien encumbers a one half undivided interest of the
Paradise Lot which has priority to the Lindstrom's Stipulated Decree of Divorce.
b) Mrs. Lindstrom's claim to Mr. Lindstrom's half interest in the Paradise Lot is
subject to CFC' s consensual lien rights pursuant to the promissory Note, recorded
in the Clarified Notice of Lien.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, CFC prays this Court for the relief as follows:
1- For the relief as set forth above in said causes of action.
2- That Plaintiffs claims be dismissed with prejudice.
3- For costs of Court.
4- For further relief as the Court deems just.

DATED this 31 day of December, 2015.
Isl Mark Hancey
Mark B. Hancey
Attorney for Custom Floor Covering, Inc. dba Carpets of America, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND
th

COUNTERCLAIM was be delivered via the court's electronic filing system this 31 day of
December, 2015, to the following:

Shaun L. Peck
John D. Luthy
PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC
399 N. Main Street, Suite 300
Logan, UT 84321
(435) 787-9700
speck@peckhadfield.com
jluthy@peckhadfield.com

(X)

E-filing via Court's E-Filing System

( )

First Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( )

Hand Deli very

(X)

E-mail

( ) Other - U.S. Mail Delivery
Confirmation

Attorneys for Plaintiff Andrea P. Lindstrom

Isl Andy Ames
Andy Ames

~

Answer and Counterclaim of CFC
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

84

